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The 62nd session of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (Commission or CND) and its Ministerial 
Segment took place in Vienna between 14 and 22 
March 2019. Protracted and sometimes conflicted 
discussions led up to the event, held ten years on 
from the Political Declaration and Plan of Action of 
2009, which had passed with little sign of success. 
In the words of the 2018 World Drug Report, ‘Both 
the range of drugs and drug markets are expanding 
and diversifying as never before’.
The global situation has produced a range of often 
profoundly different policy responses by member 
states, which can loosely be characterised as head-
ing in two directions: one dominated by law en-
forcement measures, the second accepting the real-
ity of the market and seeking to manage its harmful 
effects. The decision of Canada to introduce a legally 
regulated market for cannabis has prompted a stri-
dent response by the Russian Federation, which re-
peatedly attacked the Canadian move during the 
CND. These contrasting views were reflected con-
tinually in the country statements of the Ministerial 
Segment, and in later CND sessions. The Ministerial 
Declaration itself reiterated some of the themes of 
the 2016 UNGASS Outcome Document, while re-
flecting these policy tensions between member 
states. Amongst the most significant components 
of the Ministerial Declaration is the apparently un-
precedented acknowledgement of the ‘persistent 
and emerging challenges’ faced by the international 
drug control regime.
There were eight draft resolutions proposed at the 
Committee of the Whole (CoW). The most contro-
versial of these, stemming as it did from the ten-
sions surrounding cannabis regulation policy, was 
that of the Russian Federation, finally entitled ‘Sup-
porting the International Narcotics Control Board in 
fulfilling its treaty-mandated functions in coopera-
tion with Member States and in collaboration with 
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the World 
Health Organization’ (Resolution L3). The Russian 
resolution was intended to support and enhance 
the role of the INCB in its role of policing compli-
ance with the international drug control conven-
tions, and in particular in responding to cannabis 
legalisation, which preoccupied Russia throughout 
the Commission. In the event, the resolution was 
negotiated through intensive debates at the CoW 
and in informal meetings, the ultimate version be-
ing less strident than the original. Other resolu-
tions, including some important ones on hepatitis 
C (the very first CND resolution on this topic) and 
HIV prevention among women who use drugs, are 
detailed below.
In addition, there were a number of decisions made at 
the 62nd CND regarding the scheduling of substances 
under the drug control conventions, with CND mem-
bers voting on scheduling recommendations from 
the Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD; 
on drugs and medicines) and the International Nar-
cotics Control Board (INCB; on precursors). They in-
cluded four fentanyls now included under Schedule 
1 of the 1961 Single Convention, five synthetic can-
nabinoids now included under Schedule 2 of the 
1971 Psychotropic Convention, and three precursors 
now included under Table 1 of the 1988 Trafficking 
Convention. The Commission, however, postponed 
voting on recommendations made by the ECDD in 
relation to cannabis. 
The CND was marked by vibrant civil society en-
gagement, with almost 500 civil society delegates 
attending, several countries including civil society 
representatives on their country delegations, over 
40 side events co-organised with civil society or-
ganisations, and civil society delegates delivering 
statements at the plenary. This represents a con-
tinued growth of civil society engagement in the 
Commission’s activities – despite stronger-than-
usual tensions with UN building security staff. The 
now-familiar ‘informal dialogues’ took place, with 
discussion between civil society and the CND Chair, 
the Executive Director of the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (Office or UNODC) and the 
President of the INCB.
Executive summary
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Introduction
Expectations surrounding sessions of the CND 
in Vienna are always determined by a combina-
tion of factors, including pressing – and often 
divisive – contemporary debates and the timing 
of the meeting relative to the Commission’s own 
‘review’ cycle. And so it was that member states, 
UN agency and UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) accredited NGO delegations arrived in 
the Austrian capital for the CND’s 62nd session and, 
crucially, its Ministerial Segment; an extended 
event stretching from 14 to 22 March. With prepa-
rations for the 2019 meeting having done much 
to shape the Commission’s proceedings the previ-
ous year,1 it seemed likely that the Segment, and 
the related Ministerial Declaration to which it was 
devoted, would determine not only the mood but 
also to some extent the resultant outcomes of the 
session. Bearing in mind the nature of the pro-
tracted and often laboured negotiations around 
the draft Declaration over the course of various 
reconvened and intersessional CND sessions and 
informal meetings in late 2018 and early 2019, the 
odds were high that it would be a fractious affair. 
The 2016 United Nations General Assembly Spe-
cial Session (UNGASS) on the ‘world drug problem’ 
and the related Outcome Document had arguably 
done something to take the heat out of the long 
planned 2019 ‘High Level Segment’. Yet, it could 
not divert attention from the unavoidable fact 
that at the 10-year review of progress made since 
agreeing on the Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action2 there has been – by all reasonable mea-
sures – little significant or sustained improvement 
in the global situation. Rather, as the UNODC dem-
onstrated in its 2018 World Drug Report, ‘both the 
range of drugs and drug markets are expanding 
and diversifying as never before’.3 Further, IDPC’s 
‘Taking stock’ shadow report also showed the un-
precedented levels of harms caused by repressive 
policies aiming to eradicate the illicit drug market 
over the past decade.4 
As is now well known and documented, the emer-
gence of such a situation has produced a diver-
gence in approach across member states, with each 
country dealing with the increasingly complex poli-
cy dilemma in different ways depending on a range 
of cultural and political specificities. Nonetheless, at 
the risk of attracting charges of reductivism, it re-
mains possible to identify two general directions of 
travel. On the one hand, some states have chosen 
to pursue an approach underpinned by evidence 
and human rights that puts public health at its 
core. Reflecting natural variation, the result might 
be regarded as a spectrum of market management 
approaches embracing a range of harm reduction 
interventions, the decriminalisation of some drugs 
for personal use and, in some instances, legally reg-
ulated markets for the non-medical use of cannabis 
and, although a somewhat unique case, coca. On 
the other hand, some states prefer to remain true 
to a law enforcement-dominated approach built 
around the goals of market elimination and a ‘drug 
free world’; an approach often described, including 
by members states themselves, as a ‘war on drugs’, 
and one that reflects the traditional approach of the 
UN international drug control system. 
It was within this increasingly familiar context that 
observers and participants alike wondered how the 
divide might play out at this year’s extended ses-
sion. Or in the words of one high level delegate 
from a state preferring a health- and rights-oriented 
approach put it, how the ‘club of the progressives’ 
would interact with the champions of the ‘status 
quo’; an increasingly tricky balancing act still con-
ducted within what might be referred to as the 
‘logic of consensus’ within Vienna. To be sure, mind-
ful of the Russian Federation’s bellicose response in 
preparatory meetings to Canada’s October 2018 im-
plementation of a legally regulated market for non-
medical cannabis use, there was some deliberation 
concerning not only Moscow’s likely approach to 
the issue but also its attention to diplomatic proto-
col during the session proper. It might be argued 
that the erosion of civility in public discourse has 
accompanied the rise of authoritarian populism in 
government, as demonstrated in the Twitterocracy 
of US President Donald Trump and elsewhere. Re-
cent experience has shown how this erosion has 
penetrated even the institutions of the United Na-
tions, which customarily represent a bastion of di-
plomacy and formal courtesy. Although they have 
been increasingly evident at the CND for the past 
decade or more, the tensions underlying the sup-
posed ‘Vienna consensus’ appear to be erupting 
into an ever more strident and intolerant discourse 
of polarisation.
Indeed, it was with this environment that the Rus-
sian Federation introduced for negotiation at the 
regular segment a resolution intended to bolster 
the power of the International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB or Board) in its response to states 
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pursuing regulated markets. Although from IDPC’s 
perspective a pragmatic approach to dealing with 
cannabis markets, regulation certainly exceeds the 
inherent flexibilities of the current treaty framework 
and thus stands as a key point of systemic tension 
requiring attention from the CND. And this helps 
explain why Resolution L3 became a point of keen 
anticipation in the days leading up to the session. 
However, while cannabis and the implications of 
regulated markets on the international control sys-
tem have arguably been the focal point for diverg-
ing views in recent years, delegations once again 
approached the meeting with opposing perspec-
tives on a range of other issues, including the use 
of the death penalty for drug offences and, despite 
high-level rhetorical commitments, the general 
implementation of drug policy in line with human 
rights norms and principles.  
Within such a context, and – as has been increas-
ingly the case in recent years – mindful of the use 
of closed informal meetings by member states, 
this report aims to provide an overview of the 
central issues debated during the 62nd session 
of the Commission and its Ministerial Segment. 
With the ongoing objective of adding an often 
missed, yet crucial and holistic, human element 
to the formal UN reports of the meeting, as well 
as focusing on inter-state relations, the publica-
tion devotes considerable attention to the in-
creasingly significant civil society engagement. 
In addition to statements within plenary sessions 
and involvement in side events, this includes the 
now regularised NGO dialogues with the heads of 
the core UN drug control bodies (the UNODC and 
the INCB) as well as with the CND chair. Moreover, 
in attempting once again to go beyond a merely 
descriptive account, the report offers some anal-
ysis of key topics of debate, both within the Min-
isterial and regular segments. In so doing it seeks 
to identify emerging and reoccurring issues as 
well as common narrative themes identifiable 
in member state statements, interventions and 
negotiating positions. Where appropriate, com-
parisons are also made with past CND sessions 
to identify trends and patterns within particular 
issues areas. As in previous years, a supplemen-
tary – and searchable – account of the entire 
session can be found on the CND Blog.5 Official 
documentation relating to the session, including 
the official ECOSOC report, can be found on the 
UNODC website.6 
The Ministerial Segment
The Ministerial Segment of the 62nd CND opened on 
Thursday 14 March 2019, approximately a decade 
after the meetings that gave birth to the 2009 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action; a document 
regarded by many analysts and commentators, 
including sections within the United Nations drug 
control apparatus and among some member states, 
as a project marked by its general failure.
Structurally, the arrangements for the 2019 Com-
mission were somewhat odd, with the Ministerial 
Declaration (see Box 1) being published prior to the 
Member States’ debates about it; an approach de-
ployed at the 2016 UNGASS and perhaps reflective 
of a general reluctance in recent years to re-open 
high-level documents to negotiation. Indeed, the fi-
nal text of the Declaration emerged following mul-
tiple meetings prior to the 2019 CND, including re-
convened and intersessional encounters stretching 
across much of the past year, in addition to count-
less informal discussions between countries taking 
place behind closed doors.
Despite the usual rhetorical expressions of unity 
and consensus, the debates were characterised by 
profound disagreements and tensions that were to 
be reflected not only in in the Ministerial Segment 
itself, but also across the regular CND session, both 
at the plenary and the CoW (as we shall see below). 
A central area of conflict, which has been building 
for several years, revolved around the issue of can-
nabis and its associated policies of control – an in-
creasingly problematic topic brought further into 
the foreground by Canada’s recently enacted legali-
sation of non-medical consumption.
The Segment’s opening slideshow, comprising a 
well-produced video complete with a sound track 
of pastoral acoustic guitars,7 did its best to set the 
mood music for the event, evoking as it did the in-
terconnecting notions of ‘shared problems, shared 
solutions’ and the ‘Vienna Spirit’; the latter perhaps 
a rebrand of the now somewhat battered ‘Vienna 
consensus’ motif. Following statements from the 
Youth Forum, the Scientific Network and the Civil 
Society Task Force, Yury Fedotov, Executive Direc-
tor of the UNODC, continued with an upbeat mes-
sage stressing the many things ‘that unite us in this 
room’, the drug control Conventions that repre-
sent the ‘cornerstone’ of the response to the ‘world 
drug problem’ and multilateral solutions to global 
problems. He acknowledged the challenge faced 
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by countries and UN agencies in the form of pro-
liferating production, trafficking and consumption 
of an ever-widening range of drugs. Despite this 
challenge, he chose to stress the progress seen over 
the past decade, declaring that: ‘We have increased 
understanding of multifaceted drug problems and 
the balanced responses needed to confront them. 
We have continuously strengthened international 
cooperation and operational coordination.’8
Mr. Fedotov’s speech was followed by that of Dr. Vi-
roj Sumyai, President of the INCB, who focused, in 
accordance with his organisation’s mandate, more 
closely on issues of compliance with the drug con-
trol conventions: ‘the achievements in their imple-
mentation are vast’ he said. After a general com-
ment on the 2016 UNGASS and the high levels of 
adherence to the drug control treaties, Dr. Sumyai 
focused on Afghanistan. Here he mentioned the 
Board’s invocation of Article 14 bis of the 1961 
Single Convention, the provision of technical and 
financial assistance to states deemed to be seri-
ously endangering the aims of the Convention 
(Article 14). This is not unusual since that country 
has had a long and problematic relationship with 
Article 14 due to the deteriorating situation relating 
to illicit opium production within its borders. That 
said, as we shall see, while a normally narrow point 
of discussion, a broader application of the Article 
was to be raised by several member states over the 
course of the meeting. Dr. Sumyai then went on to 
reference to Board’s recent Annual Report, which 
contains strong criticism of more tolerant policies 
toward the use of cannabis (see below). 
Dr. Tedros, meanwhile, Director-General of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and one of three 
senior UN officials (including the Secretary General,9 
and the President of the General Assembly10) that 
submitted video-presentations for the opening 
morning, spoke of ‘a public health crisis unlike any-
thing we have seen before’. He argued that ‘the opi-
oid crisis in North America has brought a sharper 
focus to this issue’.11 This crisis demonstrates, said 
Dr. Tedros, that it is ‘time to consider alternative ap-
proaches’, specifically those that prioritise public 
health and human rights. 
Within his own video-presentation, António 
Guterres significantly chose to draw attention to 
the newly formed UN System Coordination Task 
Team on the Implementation of the UN System 
Common Position on drug-related matters and his 
hope that it would help the UN deliver more com-
prehensive assistance to countries facing ‘drug re-
lated challenges’. As is frequently the case when 
discussing the issue of drugs, he also referred to 
his own experiences as Prime Minister of Portu-
gal during a period of significant drug policy re-
form. In stressing that this was an approach that 
‘worked’, he also urged the audience to ‘learn from 
one another’.
[Vienna]
UN Secretary General makes a video-statement at the Ministerial Segment Credit: CND Tweets
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The prepared statements that followed and com-
prised the rest of the general debate reflected the 
tensions and at times outright conflicts that form 
a subtext to the much vaunted ‘Vienna Consensus’; 
a quixotic ideal that, despite its severely fractured 
form, continues to retain an almost sacred status 
within the conference halls of the Vienna Interna-
tional Centre when the international community 
convenes to discuss drug policy. Indeed, it is pos-
sible to illustrate a flavour of diverging perspec-
tives and resultant policy positions and approaches 
through examination of a sample of the more than 
120 country and regional group statements made 
over the course of 14 and 15 March.12 
For instance, the German Drug Commissioner, Ms. 
Marlene Mortler, began her presentation with an hon-
est depiction of the current state of affairs: ‘The world 
drug problem has neither been resolved nor has it 
lessened in recent years. In fact, what we are seeing 
in some parts of the world is a return to the War on 
Drugs and human rights violations committed in its 
name, runaway rates of opioid abuse and a global rise 
in areas under drug cultivation’.13 Germany argued for 
a rules-based multilateralism that espoused a devel-
opment-oriented drug control strategy, followed the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and that lived 
up to the ideas included in the UNGASS Outcome Doc-
ument. The European Union (EU) presentation agreed 
that ‘the drug situation is worsening in most parts of 
the world’ and included a powerful condemnation of 
capital punishment in all circumstances. Meanwhile, 
Evo Morales, President of Bolivia, pronounced that 
‘the war on drugs has failed’, and criticised the global 
financial system, through which, he contended, all of 
the proceeds of drug trafficking pass. 
With some affinity to Bolivia having also taken for-
mal – although more significant – policy decisions 
that challenge the basic prohibitive tenets of the 
extant control regime, Canada explained the evolu-
tion of its drug policy and highlighted the central-
ity of a health-oriented approach, including ‘super-
vised consumption sites, drug checking, making 
naloxone available without prescription and re-
moving barriers to access to methadone and diace-
tylmorphine’. Moving on to address what was to be-
come a key point of tension across the Commission 
in its entirety, Michelle Boudreau, Director General, 
Controlled Substances Directorate, Health Canada 
and Head of Delegation, continued: ‘…as delega-
tions are aware, Canada’s domestic public health 
approach to legalize, strictly regulate and restrict 
access to cannabis came into force on October 17th 
2018’. ‘The legislative and regulatory framework 
in place, along with the infrastructure to support 
such a framework’, she stressed, ‘has the objective 
to keep cannabis out of the hands of youth and to 
take profits out of the hands of criminals and orga-
nized crime, goals that are aligned with our com-
mitment to safeguard the health and welfare of our 
citizens’. That said, the Director General was also 
keen to highlight that, ‘We do not advocate the le-
galisation of cannabis as a solution for other states’. 
Ministerial Segment debate  Credit: CND Tweets
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Plenary of the CND. Source: ECHO
Box   1  The Ministerial Declaration on ‘Strengthening our 
actions at the national, regional and international levels to 
accelerate the implementation of our joint commitments to 
address and counter the world drug problem’   
As the most recent substantive soft law instrument 
since the UNGASS Outcome Document in 2016, it is 
no surprise that the Ministerial Declaration14 contains 
not only many of the key themes of the Document 
itself, but also reflects some of the ongoing tensions 
surrounding interpretation of its place within a 
hierarchy of outputs since 2009. Reading very 
much as a politically functional document deemed 
necessary to sustain some semblance of consensus 
for at least the duration of the Ministerial Segment, 
the Declaration presents both welcome and 
disappointing language. It also holds some mixed 
messaging that surely reflects the hard-fought nature 
of the negotiations held during various reconvened 
and intersessional CND and informal meetings in 
late 2018 and early 2019 and the unavoidable fact 
that by all reasonable measures there has been little 
significant or sustained improvement in the ‘world 
drug problem’ since 2009. 
The primary example of such internal dissonance 
can be seen in the acknowledgement of ‘tangible 
progress’ towards the ‘implementation of the 
commitments made over the past decade in 
addressing and countering the world drug problem’; 
an upbeat assessment that is immediately followed 
and largely undermined by a lengthy explanatory 
paragraph that begins with the line ‘We note with 
concern persistent and emerging challenges related 
to the world drug problem’. With an eerie sense of 
déjà vu, this juxtaposition is evocative of the UNODC 
Executive Director’s 2003 tagline ‘encouraging 
progress towards still distant goals’; a defensive tactic 
deployed at the mid-term review of the targets set by 
the 1998 UNGASS.15 
The apparently unprecedented admission of the 
challenges faced by member states is certainly 
welcome. However, it is unfortunate that the 
document sticks with the idealistic (and unrealistic) 
quest for a ‘drug free world’. As such it commits 
member states to once again ‘work towards the 
elimination’ of cultivation, production, trafficking 
and use, and reiterates the goal of ‘actively promoting 
a society free of drug abuse’. Indeed, all ‘aspirational 
goals’ of documents from high-level meetings in 
2009, 2014 and 2016 are explicitly restated, including 
the problematic eradication goals contained within 
operational paragraph 36 of the 2009 Political 
Declaration. While this is the case, it should be noted 
that such an approach towards the attainment of 
high-level goals within previous documents does 
also leave some space for member states to focus on 
aspects of the 2016 Outcome Document, including 
the Sustainable Development Agenda as mentioned 
at various points throughout. 
Ministerial Declaration adopted by consensus at the high-level segment  Credit: CND Tweets
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Another more directly positive aspect of the 
Declaration is the explicit incorporation of the 
commitment ‘to strengthen international and inter-
agency cooperation’ and ‘enhance coherence within 
the United Nations system at all levels with regard to 
the World Drug Problem’. With the emergence of an 
increasingly sophisticated system-wide approach 
across the UN, including notably within New York 
with engagement by the Chief Executives Board 
for Coordination,16 the adoption of the UN System 
Common Position, and the establishment of the UN 
System Coordination Task Team (including its March 
2019 Report, What we have learned over the last ten 
years: A summary of knowledge acquired and produced 
by the UN system on drug-related matters)17 the 
omission of such a position would have been glaring
That said, other increasingly prominent themes – at 
the rhetorical level at least – appear to have been 
the victim of the contested negotiating process and 
‘push back from more conservative governments’.18 
Key among these are real commitments to respect 
human rights and to achieve the SDGs. Consequently, 
language within the Declaration can be seen as 
a reiteration of already agreed general wording 
around both human rights and development, rather 
than a strong commitment to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights and fundamental freedoms, or to 
advance development in all aspects of drug policy, 
for the next decade.19 
Mindful of the increasing divergence of views within 
the international community and the perceived need 
for some sort of document marking the end of the 
target period set in 2009, perhaps the use of already 
agreed language is all that could be expected. Within 
this context it is positive that, drawing upon the 
Outcome Document, mention is made to improving 
availability of controlled medicines, promoting 
alternatives to conviction and punishments and 
– although as ever avoiding use of the term – harm 
reduction services. 
Similarly, it is unfortunate but anticipated that there 
is no mention of systemic tensions around either the 
death penalty for drug offences or regulated markets 
for the non-medical use of cannabis. These remain 
squarely in the ‘too hot to handle’ category. 
The faux consensus also helps explain, if not excuse, 
the omission of meaningful targets intended to help 
reduce violations of human rights. Possible finger-
holds for future work, however, might be found in the 
Declaration’s admission that ‘geographical coverage 
and availability of reliable data on various aspects of 
the world drug problem requires improvement’ (em-
phasis added). Moreover, amidst significant space 
devoted to ‘promoting and improving the collection, 
analysis and sharing of quality and comparable data’ 
and the Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQ) review 
process, it is interesting to note the following sen-
tence: ‘Ensuring the collection of reliable and compa-
rable data, through a strengthened and streamlined 
annual report questionnaire, reflects all commitments’ 
(emphasis added). Presumably ‘all commitments’ in-
clude those made at the 2016 UNGASS in relation to 
human rights, access to medicines and development 
(see Box 2).
In stark contrast to the positions of Canada and oth-
ers embracing a health- and rights-oriented per-
spective, many other states displayed their ongoing 
faith in a traditional law enforcement-dominated 
approach. In a contentious intervention, for exam-
ple, the Russian Federation’s Foreign Minister, Ser-
gey Lavrov, declared that ‘only states that honestly 
perform the regulations of the UN conventions 
have the moral right to take part in the CND’s op-
eration’.20 The not-so-oblique reference was clearly 
aimed at Canada and its implementation of regu-
lated markets for non-medical cannabis use. Any 
other approach undermines the authority of the 
CND, said Mr. Lavrov. He then went on to argue that 
the legalisation was proceeding under the pretext 
of human rights, a move that represented a ‘grave 
concern’. Legalisation was, he added, ‘a straight 
road to Hell’, reiterating that drugs represented 
an ‘evil’, a ‘plague’, a ‘tyranny’, and a ‘scourge’. The 
Russian stance was supported by Singapore that 
argued: ’First, there is a strong consensus’ and 
went on to criticise those who are attempting to 
legally regulate the use of cannabis. The Philip-
pines reinforced this stance, and celebrated the 
Presidency of Mr. Duterte, elected by a ‘landslide 
vote’. The speaker admitted to ‘shocking abuses’ in 
its ‘war on drugs’ but insisted that there were ‘not 
many’ and that they were committed by ‘rogue 
cops’. But, said the delegate, ‘abuses are no reason 
to stop the war on drugs’.21 He said that the war 
had emerged out of a drug plan that had lasted 
for years – ‘we just gave it a sharper edge, a lon-
ger blade and a wider swing’. The violence of this 
rhetoric was genuinely startling, heard as it was 
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in the heart of the United Nations. The Philippines 
was, however, determined to defend its position 
and its methods: ‘The Philippine war on drugs has 
braved withering criticism… Hand in hand with this 
vilification campaign, European NGOs fund another 
war – against our society and national security…’ 
The speaker was referring to the community insur-
gency in the country’s islands, which he claimed 
was funded by money from the EU diverted though 
an NGO. The speech appeared to conflate this alle-
gation with those NGOs that have been critical of 
the Philippine drug war and the numerous extraju-
dicial and other killings associated with it.22
One issue that apparently crossed the liberal/pro-
gressive-authoritarian divide was that of data, with 
countries of differing views arguing that improved 
data was necessary for dealing effectively with the 
‘world drug problem’ (see Box 2). This imperative 
united, for example, Malaysia and the Netherlands. 
However, there can be little doubt that the devil lies 
in the detail, and the type of data gathered and the 
uses to which it might be put is likely to vary greatly 
between countries.
Ministerial Segment roundtable 
discussions
In line with Resolution 61/10, ‘Preparations for the 
ministerial segment to be held during the sixty-
second session of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, in 201923 as well as the general debate, the 
Ministerial Segment comprised two ‘interactive 
multi-stakeholder round tables’.24 Roundtable A was 
titled, ‘Taking stock of the implementation of all 
commitments made to jointly address and counter 
the world drug problem, in particular in the light of 
the 2019 target date for the goals set in paragraph 
36 of the Political Declaration; analysing existing and 
emerging trends, gaps and challenges’. Roundtable 
B was titled ‘Safeguarding the future: enhancing our 
efforts to respond to the world drug problem through 
strengthening international cooperation, including 
means of implementation, capacity-building and 
technical assistance, on the basis of common and 
shared responsibility’. Both sessions included a range 
of contributions, including from civil society, and 
generated some worthwhile discussion. 
As is often the case, however, the hoped interac-
tivity gave way in many instances to the simple 
delivery of statements. During the discussion at 
the ‘Taking Stock’ roundtable, many states wel-
comed the progress made towards the targets set 
in 2009, but more in terms of data collection and 
information sharing than reducing the scale of the 
illicit market. A noteworthy number of speakers 
also stressed the centrality of scientific evidence-
based public health approaches. As was the case 
across the course of the full seven days, the issue 
of limited access to ‘pain relief’ received attention, 
as did the issue of extrajudicial killings. Several 
speakers noted the essential nature of adherence 
to the drug control conventions and, without 
mentioning any country by name, highlighted 
concern about the effects of the ‘legalisation’ of 
cannabis and related effects on the wellbeing of 
young people. There was a general feeling that the 
international community needs to do more work 
filling data gaps and sharing information, includ-
ing in relation to the ARQ. Importantly, there was 
also a general view that the next decade should 
focus on joint commitments made in the opera-
tional recommendations of the UNGASS outcome 
document. That said, despite some discussion 
about the lack of success towards achieving them, 
several speakers noted that the goals set out in 
2009 remain relevant and that both the Outcome 
Document and the Political Declaration should be 
implemented in a balanced and comprehensive 
matter. Interestingly, and revealing the Russian 
Federation’s view of the ‘world drug problem’ as a 
criminogenic and security issue rather than any-
thing to do with public health, the Russian del-
egate pointed out ‘that these discussions have 
bolstered my view of the fact that the drug situ-
ation is a result of narco-criminality and is closer 
and closer to narcoterrorism and criminality. If we 
don’t get our act together, we won’t be able to ad-
dress this effectively’.
The ‘Safeguarding the future’ roundtable gener-
ated similarly wide-ranging – and some might say 
at times vague – discussion, with few perceptible 
outputs. Nonetheless, some interesting interven-
tions were to be heard among many of the issues 
already discussed at the previous roundtable. In-
deed, amidst comments on shared responsibility, 
access to controlled substances for medical use, the 
increasing complexity of drug markets, links to or-
ganised crime, the need for the UNODC to cooper-
ate further with other UN bodies, the importance of 
the SDGs and the need to improve data tools and 
analysis (including in relation to the ARQ), a clear 
demarcation emerged around how best to deal 
with drug markets. For example, while Morocco 
stated the need to ‘depenalize, decriminalize, and 
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destigmatize addiction’, Pakistan noted with con-
cern moves towards ‘drug tolerant’ societies. On 
the more specific issue of cannabis regulation, Ja-
pan observed that the international drug control 
treaties are the ‘cornerstones in tackling the [world 
drug] problem’ and that while some ‘legalize can-
nabis’, ‘we have grave concerns against it and call 
attention to the INCB warnings’. This was a position 
echoed by Iran. Reflecting once again a divergence 
in views between states, Pakistan also argued that 
the 2009 Political Declaration still ‘provides strate-
gic direction’ and as such ‘does not need to be re-
placed by any political document’; an implicit and 
far from complimentary commentary on the Minis-
terial Declaration that was not to be unique across 
the course of the 62nd session. Meanwhile, the civil 
society panellist, Isabel Pereira representing the 
Colombian NGO Dejusticia, drew from the Latin 
American experience to highlight the need for drug 
policies grounded in the principles of equality, non-
discrimination, public health and development. 
Ministerial Segment side events 
Over the course of the Ministerial Segment, 12 side 
events with high-level political participation were 
held on issues as diverse as alternative development, 
drug law enforcement, health services for people 
who use drugs, access to controlled medicines, 
human rights and drug policy reform. 
Of particular importance was the launch of the In-
ternational Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug 
Policy.25 Developed by a coalition of governments, 
UN officials and human rights and drug policy ex-
perts, the Guidelines offer practical advice on how 
to incorporate international human rights commit-
ments into drug policies and programmes. The event 
included powerful remarks from the UN Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP), WHO, UNAIDS and the 
International Network of People Who Use Drugs (IN-
PUD), as well as a moving testimony from Justice Ed-
win Cameron of South Africa, who shared his experi-
ence of being the first homosexual man living with 
HIV named as a judge under Mandela’s government 
shortly after the apartheid ended. In his intervention, 
Justice Cameron highlighted the clear links between 
drug use, stigma and disproportionate criminal jus-
tice responses in his country.26 
Another event of interest related to the global 
overdose response, with presentations from the 
UNODC, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction, the governments of Romania, 
Slovenia, the UK and the USA, and two civil society 
speakers representing the EU Civil Society Forum on 
Drugs and the Romanian Association Against AIDS. 
The panellists called for the expansion of, and fund-
ing for, critical harm reduction interventions such 
as naloxone distribution, supervised consumption 
rooms, OST and drug checking to respond to the re-
cent surge in overdose deaths in Europe and North 
America. The urgent need to address legislative, po-
litical and structural barriers was also highlighted, 
in particular reducing stigma, decriminalisation 
Isabel Pereira, presenting on behalf of Dejusticia at the ‘Safeguarding the future’ roundtable Credit: Marie Nougier, IDPC
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and the empowering people who use drugs in the 
harm reduction response.27 
Running in parallel, the side event on the Global 
Fund was strategically important from a civil society 
standpoint. Resulting from years of advocacy with 
the French government, this was the first opportuni-
ty for the French Civil Society Platform on Drug Policy 
(an informal coalition of a dozen French NGOs work-
ing together on international drug policy advocacy) 
to organise a side event in partnership with their 
government at the CND. Chaired by a representative 
of the Platform, the event underscored the need for 
increased leadership in funding the harm reduction 
response, especially in light of the 6th replenishment 
conference of the Global Fund next October.28 
Finally, the high-level event on the ‘complex-
ity of the drug problem’ offered concrete op-
tions for reform at country level in the fields of 
criminal justice, on the promotion of health and 
human rights and around cannabis regulation, 
with interventions from Guatemala, Mexico, the 
Netherlands and IDPC. The discussion was partic-
ularly timely, coming just an hour after the Ministe-
rial Declaration had been adopted in the Plenary.29 
CND regular session: Plenary 
discussions
Unsurprisingly, discussions within the regular 
segment plenary repeated similar themes and 
patterns to those already heard in the Ministerial 
Segment, in terms of both the general debate 
and the roundtables. Indeed, most statements 
and interventions within the regular segment 
built upon points made in the previous week, 
although with a surprising lack of reference to the 
Ministerial Declaration itself in many instances. 
Thus, amidst the standard recounting of a range 
of national process indicators, including drug 
seizures and crop eradication, as well as policy and 
administrative advances designed to demonstrate 
that states are doing something to counter the 
‘world drug problem’, came more signs of divisions 
and divergence across a number of core issues, 
principally cannabis, human rights and in relation 
to the latter, national sovereignty. 
As had been the case at the 2018 session of the 
Commission, Canada kept a low profile regarding 
its shift towards a regulated cannabis market for 
non-medical use. Having unavoidably addressed 
the issue within the Ministerial Segment, such a 
tactic was no doubt designed to the limit criti-
cism from some states and the INCB. The approach 
was not especially successful. As during 14 and 15 
March, several states noted their concern. Notable 
among these were Belarus and Japan, with the lat-
ter apparently following a set message across nu-
merous interventions. Belarus stressed that since 
cannabis legalisation was not in line with the 
treaties the international community needed to 
prevent ‘dilution’, while also adding the view that 
Side event on the International Guidelines on Human Rights 
and Drug Policy Credit: CND Tweets
Side event on the complexity of the drug problem Credit: CND 
Tweets
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Box   2   Moving towards non-traditional metrics?   
As noted here and in previous IDPC reports on 
CND proceedings30 the issue of drug policy metrics 
and indicators has had an increasing profile at the 
Commission in recent years. This is partly to do with 
the ongoing review of the ARQ; a key tool used by 
the UNODC to collect data from member states for, 
among other things, the preparation of the World 
Drug Report. Indeed, as well as mention within the 
roundtables, several statements, for example by 
France and Jamaica, made specific reference to the 
ARQ review process. 
That said, a noticeable – if admittedly relatively 
limited – change in approach to the issue was made 
at the 62nd session, in relation to the mention of non-
traditional drug policy indicators. It is true that most 
states across the entire event spoke of the importance 
of ‘reliable, comprehensive and comparable data’, 
with many apparently reflecting upon this in terms 
of traditional process indicators (including seizures) 
as well as some health-related data. However, other 
states also broadened the scope. For example, 
while Chile spoke of data collection in relation to the 
SDGs, the Swiss reflected upon domestic efforts to 
link drug policy statistics and human development. 
‘Statistics are the past and future of drug policy’, the 
delegate stressed; a position bolstered once again 
by the Swiss co-sponsorship of a side event devoted 
to the issue, this year on aligning data collection with 
UNGASS implementation and the SDGs.31 Norway, 
another ardent supporter of a recalibration of drug 
policy metrics, was also vocal on the issue. As well as 
putting forward the general view that ‘more work 
needs to be done on metrics’, the Norwegian delegate 
stressed that this was particularly the case in relation 
to ‘developing metrics and indicators to better assess 
the effectiveness of our efforts and monitor progress, 
reflecting the seven chapters of the UNGASS outcome 
document’. As was the case in 2018, however, it was left 
to the OHCHR to crystallise the current dilemma facing 
the international community: the disconnect between 
member states’ high order commitments to human 
rights and measuring the outcomes of policy practice 
on the ground. 
During his statement under Item 11 (Follow-up to 
the Special Session of the General Assembly on the 
world drug problem held in 2016, including the 
seven thematic areas of the outcome document to 
of the special session), the OHCHR representative 
specifically addressed the issue of measuring drug 
policies from a human rights perspective. In this 
regard he pointed out that ‘Protecting human 
rights within drug laws, policies and strategies 
requires tracking data and conducting a regular 
assessment of the human rights situation as it relates 
to drug control’. ‘There is a growing realization’, he 
continued, ‘that traditional indicators regarding 
arrests, seizures and criminal justice responses are 
inadequate to show the real impact of drug policies 
on communities’. As a result, it was argued, ‘The 
success of drug control strategies should increasingly 
be measured through an assessment of the impact 
of drug control efforts on the enjoyment of human 
rights and other critical aspects such as security, 
welfare, health and social-economic development’. 
Moving on to concrete approaches, the OHCHR 
speaker drew attention to the fact that ‘Human rights-
based and gender sensitive indicators are being 
used in many areas, including poverty reduction, 
development and other critical areas, to ensure that 
States fulfil all obligations created by the various 
human rights, or at least that they can measure their 
progress in this regard’. Moreover, it was stressed, ‘In 
2009, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health recommended three 
categories of indicators – structural, process and 
outcome indicators (nine indicators in total) for 
assessing the drug policy from the right to health 
perspective (A/65/255, paragraph 72)’.  He concluded 
by pointing out that ‘OHCHR has developed a set of 
human rights indicators for the realization of human 
rights and a guidance on a human right based 
approach to data collection in the implementation of 
the Sustainable Development Goals’. ‘All these tools 
could be useful’, he concluded, ‘in strengthening and 
streamlining existing data-collection and analysis 
tools in drug control efforts’. 
Judging by the ongoing reluctance of some states to 
integrate any human rights indicators into any future 
data collection apparatus (whether it be at national 
or international level in the form of a revised ARQ), 
the extent to which such recommendations might be 
taken on board remains to be seen.
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The Committee of the Whole: 
Opening ‘Pandora’s box’
Draft resolutions are debated and approved at the 
CoW, a technical committee of the CND, prior to 
submission to the Plenary for adoption. This year 
there were eight resolutions submitted to the CoW 
(see Box 3). The chair of the Committee was the First 
Vice-Chair of the 62nd Commission, Mr. Kazem Ghar-
ib Abadi (Islamic Republic of Iran). 
Resolution L3: ‘Supporting the International 
Narcotics Control Board in fulfilling its treaty-
mandated role’
It is in the CoW that countries’ cultural, social and 
underlying philosophical positions are often 
revealed in their clearest form. This was certainly 
the case this year, particularly in the example of the 
Russian Federation Resolution L3, ‘Supporting the 
International Narcotics Control Board in fulfilling 
its treaty-mandated role’.32 In order to understand 
the importance of this resolution, it is necessary to 
review the discussions taking place in the build up 
to the 62nd CND over the past year.
At the second intersessional meeting of the CND 
in June 2018, Mikhail Ulyanov, the Permanent 
Representative of the Russian Federation in Vi-
enna, spoke of the ‘dramatic development in in-
ternational drug control policy related to recent 
measures taken by the Canadian authorities’.33 He 
alleged that this move would ‘tangibly breach the 
UN drug control conventions’. He continued by 
noting that the INCB had written to Canada with 
its assessment of these developments, underlin-
ing that they were incompatible with the treaty 
obligations to which Canada is bound. Mr. Ulyanov 
said that he regretted that the Canadian authori-
ties had ‘totally ignored’ the Board’s statement. 
Canada had attempted to justify the legalisation 
of cannabis, he went on, by reference to Paragraph 
1 of the Preamble to the 1961 Single Convention, 
stating that the measure would contribute to pro-
tecting the health and welfare of its people. ‘This 
argument is completely false and means a switch 
of the notions’, judged the Russian Federation. 
With growing hostility, the Ambassador declared 
that: ‘Apparently, it is assumed in Ottawa that this 
serious violation of the drug control conventions 
will pass unnoticed… This assumption is abso-
lutely wrong… Ottawa has no right to make uni-
lateral decisions, which are meant to impact the 
there were ‘hazards’ associated with attempts to 
internationally reschedule the substance. Echo-
ing these ideas, the Japanese delegate noted in 
relation to cannabis: ‘we support the INCB’ and the 
‘international society must work together’. ‘Why?’, 
the delegate asked before going on to answer this 
rhetorical question – because of the Japanese con-
cern with the cultivation of THC cannabis and ‘with 
popular products such as cannabis cookies/choco-
lates’. ‘Japan believes’, he continued, that ‘this could 
influence innocent and juveniles, and cause severe 
health disorders’.
Moving away from the issue of cannabis, the 
Japanese delegate was also keen to point out his 
country’s quest for a ‘drug-free society’ based on a 
‘balanced approach’ to drug policy. In this regard, 
however, it was stressed that each country has ‘its 
own approach’. Acknowledging the arguably in-
escapable scientific evidence base underpinning 
many interventions, he stated that ‘We know that 
some measures included in harm reduction are 
effective and important in certain conditions and 
such projects carried out in countries affected by 
infectious diseases should be promoted’. ‘Howev-
er’, the delegate continued, ‘these should not be 
recommended to all countries and should not be 
used excessively. Japan has been able to stabilize 
domestic drug abuse by implementing programs 
based on progressive policies through rehabilita-
tion and preventing methamphetamine abuse’.
Tensions between human rights and national 
sovereignty could also be seen more starkly in 
relation to the death penalty for drug-related of-
fences. While many statements included explicit 
opposition to both the death penalty and extra-
judicial killings, including those from Norway, 
France, the EU, Canada and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), others 
implicitly defended these policy choices. In light of 
the somewhat tetchy relationship between some 
sections of civil society and the VIC security team 
at this year’s meeting (see below), it is also note-
worthy that the OHCHR statement included the 
following: ‘Our Office values the engagement of 
civil society organizations and effected communi-
ties, including people who use drugs, in the devel-
opment and the implementation of drug policies. 
Civil society organizations should be  supported. 
They should be protected from any intimidation, 
threat and harassment’.
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integrity of the international drug control conven-
tions, and promote a selective approach to their 
implementation, thus opening Pandora’s box’. 
‘This approach’, he added, ‘could lead to the con-
trol system ‘undergoing deep erosion and poten-
tially being destroyed’. Canada, as a member of the 
CND, was then accused of ‘destroying the conven-
tions from inside’. He urged the country to change 
its mind about legalisation and hoped that ‘a re-
sponsible approach will finally prevail in Ottawa’.
On the same day at the intersessional meeting, 
Canada provided what was effectively a response 
to the Russian intervention. The Permanent Repre-
sentative of Canada in Vienna, Ambassador Heidi 
Hulan, told delegates that the country recognises 
that ‘cannabis legalization is a policy issue that is 
of great interest to the Commission and of con-
cern to some States Parties to the drug Conven-
tions’.34 She noted that Canada had briefed both 
the CND and the INCB several times on its canna-
bis policy. In her June 2018 submission, Ms. Hulan 
made a crucial point to delegates: ‘The reality is 
that, in Canada at least, our former approach sim-
ply did not work. Despite nearly a century of strict 
criminal prohibition of cannabis, supported by 
substantial law enforcement resources, cannabis 
use has become widespread across Canada today 
and the drug is easily available to Canadian youth 
and adults alike’.35
She continued that the Canadian government was 
well aware of the potential harms to youth from the 
consumption of cannabis, and that this was one of 
the chief motivating factors behind the search for 
a more effective policy response. She also noted 
that that the percentage of Canadian youth using 
tobacco had dropped from 27% in 1985 to 10% in 
2015 – a public health success story whose lessons 
had been transferred to the country’s new cannabis 
policy. The Canadian speaker next elaborated on 
the policy significance of the Canadian measures, 
making it clear that they were a response to its do-
mestic situation and were not intended to apply 
in other countries with their own distinctive chal-
lenges. She also wished to make it clear that Cana-
da remains a strong supporter of the international 
drug control system. ‘We recognise that our treaty 
partners are pursuing different policy approaches 
to cannabis, and we do not intend for our system to 
negatively impact their efforts’. Consequently, she 
added, the trafficking of cannabis across Canada’s 
borders would remain a serious criminal offence.
This was the context in which the Russian Federa-
tion introduced its resolution on ‘Supporting the 
INCB’; the debates had continued throughout the 
previous CND sessions and at numerous infor-
mal meetings, and tensions clearly remained. The 
Russian resolution was ‘expressing deep concern 
about legalization of non-medical use of certain 
Resolution L3 adopted at the CoW Credit: Carrie Fowlie
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failure represented by the drug control orthodoxy. 
Japan and Russia had already suggested in their 
statements in the plenary to invoke Article 14 of 
the 1961 Single Convention against countries that 
have legalised and regulated cannabis, with Russia 
mentioning Canada specifically (see below).
The informal discussions between the Russian Fed-
eration and its co-proposers37 and those with reser-
vations on aspects of Resolution L3 included much 
regarding the treaty-mandated role of the INCB. 
Much of the debate in the CoW was focused on 
limiting the work of the INCB to its mandate within 
the treaty, in particular to dismantle Operative Para-
graph 8, which intended to ‘ensure that the Board 
has sufficient resources to carry out its treaty-man-
dated functions fully and effectively, including in 
monitoring treaty implementation and compliance 
by, inter alia, strengthening the Board’s capacity to 
undertake legal research and analysis’. 
Strengthening the Board’s ‘capacity to undertake 
legal research and analysis’ would have been po-
tentially problematic and would have widened the 
Board’s mandate. The INCB self-defines as a ‘qua-
si-judicial body’ and its membership does not in-
clude experts in international law. While the Board 
has the mandate to raise concerns about the vio-
lation of treaty obligations, such as allowing the 
recreational use of cannabis, it has no mandate 
drugs in some regions, which represents a chal-
lenge to the universal implementation of the 
drug control conventions, a challenge to public 
health and well-being, particularly among young 
people, and a challenge to the States parties to 
the conventions’.36 
It is notable that the phrasing of the Russian text is 
almost identical to that of the INCB in its criticisms 
of Canada. In its operative paragraphs, Resolution 
L3 ‘welcomes the continuous efforts of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board’ in monitoring 
and meeting the challenges faced by the global 
community. It also invites the Board to ‘proac-
tively implement its mandate’, to try to achieve 
universal adherence to the Conventions, ‘and to 
ensure their implementation by all States parties 
in good faith through applying, where appropri-
ate, various means envisaged in the conventions’. 
The unnamed ‘various means’ are presumably a 
veiled reference to measures such as the invoca-
tion of Article 14 of the Single Convention, which 
may be invoked by the INCB in situations where 
states parties are seen to fail to adhere to their 
treaty obligations. This was, consequently, a po-
tentially powerful resolution that we can only as-
sume was directed at those countries, like Cana-
da, which have elected to attempt to implement 
innovative measures in the face of a century of 
Box   3  Resolutions agreed at the 62nd session of the CND  
Resolution 62/1: Strengthening international 
cooperation and comprehensive regulatory and 
institutional framewowrks for the control of pre-
cursors used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances 
Resolution 62/2: Enhancing detection and iden-
tification capacity for synthetic drugs for non-
medical use by increasing international collabora-
tion 
Resolution 62/3: Promoting alternative devel-
opment as a development-oriented drug control 
strategy 
Resolution 62/4: Advancing effective and inno-
vative approaches, through national, regional and 
international action, to address the multifaceted 
challenges posed by the non-medical use of syn-
thetic drugs, particularly synthetic opioids 
Resolution 62/5: Enhancing the capacity of 
Member States to adequately estimate and assess 
the need for internationally controlled substances 
for medical and scientific purposes 
Resolution 62/6:  Promoting measures to pre-
vent transmission of HIV attributable to drug use 
among women and for women who are exposed 
to risk factors associated with drug use, including 
by improving access to post-exposure prophylaxis 
Resolution 62/7:  Promoting measures to prevent 
and treat viral hepatitis C attributable to drug use 
Resolution 62/8:  Supporting the International 
Narcotics Control Board in fulfilling its treaty-
mandated functions in cooperation with Mem-
ber States and in collaboration with the Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs and the World Health  
Organization 
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to act – this remains the prerogative of member 
states and the CND, and the Board has no man-
date to interpret international law. The resolution 
would have given the Board more opportunities 
to engage with, and give direction to, member 
states and the CND on the issue of non-medical 
use of cannabis. The paragraph might be seen as 
an attempt to counter recent debates about treaty 
reform options, such as the inter se modification 
of the UN drug control conventions, put forward 
by the Global Drug Policy Observatory (GDPO), 
the Transnational Institute (TNI), and the Washing-
ton Office on Latin America (WOLA).38 An inter se 
agreement on cannabis regulation would allow a 
group of countries to modify certain treaty provi-
sions amongst themselves, for instance regarding 
non-medical cannabis, while maintaining a clear 
commitment to the original treaty’s aim to pro-
mote the health and welfare of humankind and to 
the original treaty obligations vis-à-vis countries 
that are not party to the agreement. Such a legal-
ly-grounded and coordinated collective response 
has clear benefits compared to a chaotic scenario 
of a growing number of different unilateral reser-
vations and questionable re-interpretations.
The INCB already attempted to intervene in this 
debate by way of writing a letter to the Canadian 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in the course of 
their studying of Bill C-45 that legalised and regu-
lated the non-medical use and production of can-
nabis. Then, it had argued against the possible 
option of inter se modification, declaring the limita-
tion of cannabis to medical and scientific use in the 
treaties to be a peremptory norm in international 
law, for which implementation is a sine qua non of 
compliance with the international legal drug con-
trol framework.39 Seen in this context, it could be 
argued that Resolution L3 was designed to permit 
the Board’s intervention in this debate and provide 
financial resources to counter legal analysis that 
would give reform-minded nations room for ma-
noeuvre to legalise and regulate non-medical use 
and production of cannabis within the legal con-
fines of international law.
Informal consultations and the debate in the CoW 
continued during the week, with members of the 
INCB Secretariat pacing around nervously in the 
corridors, and the United States, Canada and sev-
eral European allies clashing with Russia. The reso-
lution was the last one to be completed on Friday 
just in time for the final plenary. The final version of 
the resolution was amended to: ‘Invites the Board 
to continue diligently performing all the functions 
entrusted to it under the three drug control con-
ventions, adhering to and mindful of its mandates, 
taking into consideration, as appropriate, the con-
stitutional limitations, legal systems and domes-
tic law of Parties’, a phrasing in which the invita-
tion to the Board is significantly circumscribed in 
multiple ways. 
In general, and much to the relief of Canada, the 
finally agreed resolution was much more balanced 
and considerably less directly hostile to measures 
such as legalisation, though it did retain the core aim 
of criticising ‘responses not in conformity with the 
three international drug control conventions’, men-
tioned in the 2019 Ministerial Declaration, though 
here this was paired with, and balanced by, ‘not in 
conformity with applicable international human 
rights obligations’. Together these were viewed as 
composing a challenge to ‘the implementation of 
joint commitments based on the principle of com-
mon and shared responsibility’.40 One can see here 
the value of the UN’s ‘consensus’, a reality of which 
IDPC has in the past often spoken critically. How-
ever, the process of consensus largely emasculated 
a potentially authoritarian resolution by modifying 
and re-crafting the language it contained, thereby 
effectively closing this particular Pandora’s box – at 
least for the time being.
Resolution L4: ‘Promoting measures to prevent 
and treat viral hepatitis C attributable to drug 
use’
Yet another important contribution to the Resolu-
tions was L4 ‘Promoting measures to prevent and 
treat viral hepatitis C attributable to drug use’. This 
was the first CND resolution devoted to the impor-
tant topic of hepatitis C among people who use 
drugs – and was submitted by Norway. This is a 
particularly timely and critical resolution since the 
WHO estimated that in 2017, approximately 71 mil-
lion people were chronically infected with hepatitis 
C, with 23% of new infections and 33% of HCV-mor-
tality attributable to injecting drug use. Deaths at-
tributed to the hepatitis C virus outstrip those from 
HIV, and the resolution highlights this in its pream-
bular paragraphs.41
Early in the negotiation process, the resolution also 
gained support from Egypt (an unusual ally for 
such affairs at the CND, but a global champion of 
the hepatitis C response) and was eventually also 
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co-sponsored by a varied list of members states in-
cluding Australia, Andorra, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, 
New Zealand and Ukraine. 
The original draft referred to the fact that ‘some 
countries and regions have made significant prog-
ress in expanding health-related risk and harm 
reduction programmes’. However, in response to 
objections from those countries to whom the men-
tion of ‘harm reduction’ remains anathema, this ref-
erence was removed. Instead, as has so often been 
the case in the past, the term was replaced by ‘some 
countries have made considerable progress in ex-
panding evidence-based, comprehensive HIV and 
HCV interventions aimed at minimizing the adverse 
public health and social consequences of drug use’. 
These evidence-based interventions are, nonethe-
less, what are normally termed ‘harm reduction’ 
measures; the fact that such interventions are uti-
lised is perhaps more important than what they 
are called, particularly for those who benefit from 
them. However, it is frankly bizarre that after de-
cades of the effective use of harm reduction inter-
ventions, there remains a group of countries who 
insist that they must not be referred to by name. 
This is particularly so given the stand taken by Ger-
many and the ‘Group of Twenty Six’ in 2009, when 
an ‘Interpretive Statement’ was appended to the 
Political Declaration, stating that the term ‘related 
support services’ included ‘measures which a num-
ber of states, international organizations and NGOs 
call harm reduction measures’.42 Moreover, the term 
‘harm reduction’ was used in the 2016 General As-
sembly High Level Meeting on Ending AIDS, and 
appears in the Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS 
produced in that meeting, where it is noted that 
‘some countries and regions have made significant 
progress in expanding health-related risk and harm 
reduction programmes’.43
However, the resolution specifically references 
and recommits to the WHO’s global health sector 
strategy on viral hepatitis 2016-2021 – a docu-
ment which explicitly and strongly endorses harm 
reduction and ‘public health alternatives to crimi-
nalization’, and even includes a specific target for 
member states to provide 300 sterile needles and 
syringes per person who injects drugs per year 
by 2030.44 Acknowledging the role of the WHO 
as ‘the lead United Nations agency for the hepa-
titis response’, the resolution also cites the WHO 
Guidance on Prevention of Viral Hepatitis B and C 
among People Who Inject Drugs.45 
Some content was added to the resolution during 
negotiations, including on universal health care, 
while – as in several other resolutions – there were 
lengthy discussions about terminology between 
‘drug users’ and ‘people who use drugs’ (the lat-
ter generally regarded as being more humanising 
and less stigmatising). The eventual compromise 
was to stay true to the language used in the origi-
nal source of the text each time, leading to a mix 
in the wording used throughout the document. 
Positively, Norway’s efforts to include an operative 
paragraph on working with ‘networks of people 
who use drugs’ eventually led to the CND’s first 
acknowledgement of ‘community-led organiza-
tions and initiatives’ and the need to engage them 
in programme design, prevention, diagnosis and 
treatment. Other operative paragraphs recommit, 
inter alia, to key harm reduction measures, the rel-
evant SDG targets, voluntary screening for hepati-
tis C, and services in prison.
Resolution L5: Enhancing detection and identifi-
cation capacity of synthetic drugs for non-medi-
cal use by increasing international collaboration
Another point of tension between the Russian 
Federation and Canada, as well as groups of coun-
tries on both sides, was the question of stigmati-
sation of people who use drugs. During the CoW 
discussions on Resolution L5, ‘Enhancing detec-
tion and identification capacity of synthetic drugs 
for non-medical use by increasing international 
collaboration’, which was proposed by Australia, 
the Australian delegate attempted to include ref-
erence to non-stigmatising attitudes in the train-
ing of staff. Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Iran and 
Japan were amongst those countries that sought 
to block the use of this language, arguing that it 
had no relevance here. Japan went somewhat fur-
ther and claimed that the term was ‘not interna-
tionally established’, leading Canada to refer to its 
Resolution 61/11 of 2018, which explained in de-
tail the concept of stigma and elaborated upon its 
role in deterring people who use drugs from tak-
ing up drug treatment. In the event, no mention 
of stigmatisation was retained in the final version 
of Resolution L5. Disputes over the use of the term 
and concept of stigmatisation occurred in discuss-
ing various other resolutions, and it appears to be 
a term that undercuts the drug control consensus 
– and is likely to continue to do so. Nonetheless, it 
remains an important discourse, which IDPC will 
further support.
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Resolution L6: Promoting alternative develop-
ment as a development-oriented drug control 
strategy
Resolution L6 was submitted by Germany, Peru 
and Thailand.46 It argued in favour of alternative 
development, and specified that drug policies 
and programmes, including in the field of 
development, should be conducted in line with 
the UN Charter, the principles of human rights 
and the Sustainable Development Agenda and its 
Goals, though the place of the latter within it was 
relatively minor. As is customary for many drug 
control resolutions, it also traced the trajectory 
and reaffirmed the commitments and documents 
of 2009, 2014 and 2016. 
There was protracted discussion over a phrase re-
ferring to alternative development as a support to 
create ‘societies free of drug abuse’. Canada sug-
gested another and more realistic option, that of 
‘minimising the adverse public health and social 
consequences of drug abuse’. Russia announced 
that it could accept ‘society free of drug abuse’ in 
the singular, while France added that it would not 
accede to the plural use and supported Canada 
on the inclusion of human rights protections. Peru 
stated that this was a technical resolution, and that 
it had used previously agreed language precisely 
to avoid the politicisation of the issue. The claim 
that others’ interventions constituted political read-
ings of the ‘purely technical’ question at hand was a 
tactic used by numerous states, while insisting (of 
course) that their own interventions were purely 
technical. To some extent, it took place across the 
divide between progressive and conservative states 
at the CND. 
In the event, the resolution was agreed, with the 
phrase now appearing in its singular form: ‘alter-
native development is an important, lawful, viable 
and sustainable alternative to the illicit cultivation 
of drug crops and an effective measure to counter 
the world drug problem and other drug-related 
crime challenges, as well as a choice in favour of 
promoting a society free of drug abuse’.  
Canada had noted that it had accepted the phrase 
‘society free of drug abuse’ in the Ministerial Decla-
ration because there it was balanced by strong hu-
man rights language, recognition of fundamental 
freedoms and the inherent dignity of all individu-
als. In this resolution, a similar trade-off was made 
between the law enforcement conservatives and 
the human-rights progressives, the outcome being 
somewhat convoluted as the text sought to express 
a consensus involving radically different political 
positions and sets of values.
Resolution L9: Promoting measures to prevent 
transmission of HIV for women who use drugs, 
including by improving access to post-exposure 
prophylaxis
The disputes over the optimum manner of refer-
ring to people who use drugs appeared once 
again in L9 ‘Promoting measures to prevent trans-
mission of HIV for women who use drugs, includ-
ing by improving access to post-exposure prophy-
laxis’, a resolution proposed by Brazil. Introducing 
the resolution, the Brazilian speaker explained 
that it had already been through four sets of in-
formals, and that a form of language had been 
adopted to get around the lack of consensus over 
‘women who use drugs’ and ‘women drug us-
ers/abusers’. Brazil requested assistance from the 
Chair to achieve flexibility of the same kind that 
had been evidenced in L.4, in order to proceed 
with the resolution. Egypt, Pakistan, Russian Fed-
eration and China all mentioned their misgivings 
about the use of ‘women who use drugs’, the Rus-
sian delegate even asking the secretariat to clarify 
what was meant by the term: ‘Which women? Do 
we mean nonmedical users? Or do you mean abus-
ers? Misusers of medical drugs?’ The secretariat 
All eight resolutions are adopted at the CND Plenary  Credit: CND Tweets
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responded by explaining that ‘when we use the 
term “women who use drugs”, we mean women 
who use narcotic drugs, in many countries illicit 
drugs – not people who use medicines’. Ultimately, 
the resolution was adopted with, as shown above, 
the phrase ‘women who use drugs’ included in 
the title.
Changes in the Scope of Control: 
Scheduling decisions (and 
non-decisions) 
At its 41st Meeting, the WHO’s Expert Committee 
on Drug Dependence (ECDD) reviewed several 
substances, which were recommended for inclu-
sion in the control schedules of the 1961 and 1971 
Conventions.47 Recommendation were received 
at the CND for control of four fentanyls and five 
synthetic cannabinoids. The ECDD had also re-
viewed cannabis for the first time under the con-
temporary conditions of review, as well as a set of 
extracts and preparations of cannabis. However, 
since these recommendations arrived very late to 
the Commission, many states asked for more time 
to consider the complexities – both pharmacolog-
ical and political – they involved, and a postpone-
ment of the votes at this year’s CND.
The votes on substances and recommendations that 
were considered at the CND took place on 19 March, 
the CoW being suspended to allow states to partici-
pate in the voting (see Box 4).48 The four fentanyls 
were dealt with first: parafluorobutyrylfentanyl, or-
thofluorofentanyl, methoxyacetylfentanyl and cy-
clopropylfentanyl, each of which had been recom-
mended by the ECDD for control under Schedule 
1 of the 1961 Single Convention. A brief summary 
of the substances was provided by Mr. Gilles Forte 
of the WHO, and then states were invited to vote, a 
simple majority being required for inclusion in the 
1961 treaty. In the event, all four recommendations 
were agreed upon by member states, and these fen-
tanyls are now amongst those controlled under the 
Single Convention.
The five synthetic cannabinoids recommended 
for control under the 1971 Convention were 
then introduced. These were ADB-FUBINACA, 
FUB-AMB, CUMYL-4CN-BINACA, ADB-CHMINA-
CA (MAB-CHMINACA) and N-Ethylnorpentylone 
(ephylone). Again, each was voted upon, the 1972 
stipulating a two thirds majority as necessary for 
the recommendation to be adopted and the sub-
stance scheduled. As with the fentanyls, the rec-
ommendations were not viewed as controversial, 
and all five synthetic cannabinoids were voted for 
control under Schedule 2 of the 1971 Convention.
Under the 1988 Trafficking Convention, the INCB is 
mandated with making recommendations on pre-
cursors for addition to the tables of that treaty. This 
year, there were three precursors recommended 
for inclusion in Table 1 of the 1988 Convention: 
3,4-MDP-2P-methylglycidate, 3,4-MDP-2P-methyl-
glycidic acid, both pre-precursors for the manufac-
ture of MDMA, and alpha-phenylacetoacetamide 
(APAA) acid. All were voted for adoption, with a two-
thirds majority being required under the 1988 Con-
vention. A fourth substance, hydroioidic acid, had 
been notified by the government of Argentina, but 
was not recommended for scheduling by the INCB, 
which explained that other, cheaper substances 
were available with the same precursor role, and 
that controlling hydroioidic acid would not affect 
the illicit market. No states voted in favour of sched-
uling this substance when a vote was called, and it 
consequently remains outside the remit of the drug 
control system.
Nonetheless, there was considerable reaction at 
this ses sion to the ECDD’s recommendations re-
garding cannabis.49 Countries such as Japan sup-
ported the postponement of the vote, arguing that 
it would give more time for a proper consideration 
of the options. Uruguay, by contrast, regretted the 
delay, citing the growing evidence for the efficacy 
of cannabis-based medications and the need to 
change the regulatory landscape in order to facili-
tate it. The continued listing of cannabis in Sched-
ule 4 of the 1961 Convention can restrict scientific 
research into the therapeutic benefits of the drug, 
it was argued. The Uruguayan delegate added 
that, ‘We cannot ignore that this recommendation 
marks a significant change in the position of WHO, 
which during the last six decades had positioned 
itself against the use of cannabis in medicine. We 
warmly welcome this evolution in the concepts 
that the WHO is involved in’.50  The speaker went on 
to add that the postponement demonstrated that 
the CND was unable to meet the tasks assigned to 
it under the drug control conventions. Uruguay 
made a formal request to the CND that the vote 
should take place at the next Reconvened session 
in December 2019. The delegate from Jamaica 
made a similar critical point, expressing herself as 
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‘disappointed that the ECDD recommendations 
on cannabis will not be discussed at this CND. We 
could have demonstrated,’ she added, ‘that we can 
change with circumstances. Instead, this was an 
opportunity lost’.
The Russian Federation’s intervention was highly 
critical of those countries who have elected to 
regulate non-medical uses of cannabis. Point-
ing out that the ECDD recommendations have, 
unusually, been highlighted in the mass me-
dia, the speaker referred to ‘countries…violat-
ing international law by legalising cannabis’. 
He speculated that the experts of the ECDD are 
merely ‘technical experts’ and do not have to 
consider the repercussions of their decisions 
– something that is certainly not the case.51 
 The Russian speaker then asked why, after 58 
years in Schedule 4, ‘all of a sudden we have an 
expert group of the WHO saying that it needs to 
be taken out’. The Russian Federation then ac-
cused the ECDD of ‘forcing through’ the recom-
mendation, declaring that it was ‘not the WHO 
recommendation, but the ECDD recommenda-
tion’. This is a curious analysis, as the WHO ap-
points a committee of those with expert knowl-
edge of the substance, and they submit their 
recommendation to the Director-General of the 
WHO, who passes it on to the Commission. ‘The 
way they forced this theme through in such a 
hurry and with such conviction raises a multitude 
of questions in our mind’, continued the Russian 
delegate. He reported that the Russian govern-
ment had asked the ECDD for the list of scientific 
articles on which they are basing their decision, 
and received no answer to date; this, despite the 
fact that the ECDD Review document is fully ref-
erenced with numerous peer-reviewed scientific 
journal articles.52
Reflecting many of the Russian Federation’s inter-
ventions at the Commission’s 62nd session, com-
ments on the Expert Committee were overtly hos-
tile and unbalanced, and arguably motivated by the 
country’s extreme narcophobic ideology. This takes 
us back to the matters mentioned in our introduc-
tion – the polarisation of debate and the demise of 
civility even in contexts in which the language of 
diplomacy customarily holds sway. Russia had al-
ready attacked Canada for its cannabis policies and 
claimed that only those who followed what are ef-
fectively its own interpretation of the drug control 
conventions had the moral right to speak at and 
participate in the CND. Nevertheless, the postpone-
ment of the vote was probably a wise decision. Al-
though the recommendations include some clearly 
positive points, especially acknowledging the me-
dicinal usefulness of cannabis by removing it from 
Schedule 4 of the 1961 Single Convention and clari-
fying that CBD is not under international control, 
they also reveal problematic underlying evaluation 
methods and scheduling procedures, along with 
a questionable rationale for keeping cannabis in 
Schedule 1.53
CND votes to schedule new substances Credit: CND Tweets
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The INCB: Cannabis in the spot-
light
The INCB made usual interventions and statements, 
but perhaps was under increased scrutiny this year 
because of its position on cannabis. At the beginning 
of what was a busy seven days for the President of 
the Board, the first outing for Dr. Viroj Sumyai was, 
as noted above, during the opening of the Ministe-
rial Segment. Here, reminding states of their com-
mitment to the three international drug conventions 
made at the 2016 UNGASS and immediately setting 
the tone regarding their sacrosanct immutability, he 
stressed that the ‘ultimate concern of the conven-
tions is the health and welfare of all humankind’. Ig-
noring, as is the norm, some inherent contradictions 
within the Board’s logic, he went on to note that 
‘this includes the full enjoyment of human rights’, 
including ‘the right of children to be protected from 
drug abuse and drug trafficking’. Amidst a somewhat 
simplistic reference to the view that the ‘full imple-
mentation of the treaties can contribute to achieve-
ment’ of the SDGs – particularly Goal 3 relating to 
good health and wellbeing – the President gave wel-
come attention to the availability of narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances for medical purposes. 
As noted above, he also flagged up the deterioration 
of the situation in Afghanistan and the Board’s resul-
tant invocation of Article 14 bis of the Single Conven-
tion; a normally arcane issue that, this year, received 
attention beyond the usual Afghan context. As well 
as mentioning several other issues of concern, in-
cluding amphetamine-type stimulants, synthetic 
opioids, new psychoactive substances (NPS) and ‘de-
signer precursors’, Dr. Sumyai devoted considerable 
attention to cannabis. 
Box   4  Scheduling decisions at the 62nd CND  
Decision 62/1: Inclusion of parafluorobutyrylfen-
tanyl in Schedule I of the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Proto-
col
Decision 62/2: Inclusion of orthofluorofentanyl 
in Schedule I of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol
Decision 62/3: Inclusion of methoxyacetylfenta-
nyl in Schedule I of the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Proto-
col 
Decision 62/4: Inclusion of cyclopropylfentanyl 
in Schedule I of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol
Decision 62/5: Inclusion of ADB-FUBINACA in 
Schedule II of the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1971
Decision 62/6: Inclusion of FUB-AMB (MMB-FU-
BINACA, AMB-FUBINACA) in Schedule II of the Con-
vention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971
Decision 62/7:. Inclusion of CUMYL-4CN-BINACA 
in Schedule II of the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971
Decision 62/8: Inclusion of ADB-CHMINACA 
(MAB-CHMINACA) in Schedule II of the Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances of 1971
Decision 62/9: Inclusion of N-ethylnorpentylone 
(ephylone) in Schedule II of the Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances of 1971
Decision 62/10: Inclusion of “3,4-MDP-2-P methyl 
glycidate” (“PMK glycidate”) (all stereoisomers) in Ta-
ble I of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substanc-
es of 1988
Decision 62/11: Inclusion of 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl 
glycidic acid (“PMK glycidic acid”) (all stereoisomers) 
in Table I of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1988
Decision 62/12: Inclusion of alpha-phenylace-
toacetamide (APAA) (including its optical isomers) 
in Table I of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1988
Decision 62/13: Consideration of hydriodic acid 
for inclusion in the tables of the United Nations Con-
vention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances of 1988
Decision 62/14: Changes in the scope of control 
of substances: proposed scheduling recommenda-
tions by the World Health Organization on cannabis 
and cannabis-related substances: Postponed.
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‘INCB’s Annual Report warns’ he noted, ‘of the risks 
of poorly regulated medical cannabis programmes’. 
‘The legislative developments concerning the “recre-
ational” use of cannabis are a real concern’, he con-
tinued, ‘not least for their potential impact on health, 
particularly of youth’. Returning to his reoccurring 
theme of universal implementation and ‘health and 
welfare’, he stressed that the concern also resulted 
from the fact that these legislative developments ‘are 
contrary to your treaties and the commitments you 
made to one another’ (emphasis added). Ensuring 
that there was no confusion concerning the Board’s 
view, the President stressed that ‘State Parties have 
made a legal commitment to limit the use of nar-
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances exclusively 
to medical and scientific purposes. This is the fun-
damental principle of the treaties. Any divergence 
poses a grave threat to public health, particularly 
among young people, and represents a challenge to 
the States parties to the treaties’. 
While containing some valid points and others 
that merit scrutiny, it was nonetheless positive that 
he also pointed out that the ‘complex challenges’ 
raised in his statement must be addressed ‘in full 
respect of the rule of law and human rights obliga-
tions without recourse to extrajudicial responses of 
capital punishment, both of which are unjustifiable 
and unacceptable’. ‘Measures to reduce illicit sup-
ply and demand’, he continued, ‘must be carried 
out in a balanced way, and in the spirit of shared 
responsibility’. Finishing with a flourish that reflects 
the Board’s apparently unswerving faith in the ex-
tant international system, Dr. Sumyai noted that 
‘The drug challenges we see today have a profound 
impact on public health and wellbeing’. ‘Yet, over 
the past 110 years, since the first intergovernmen-
tal meeting on drug control in 1909’, he went on, 
‘similar challenges have been overcome through in-
ternational cooperation and political commitment’. 
‘I encourage you to invoke that same spirit, as you 
chart the path ahead for international cooperation 
in drug control’, he said.  
Having laid out some key themes and areas of 
concern within the Ministerial Segment, it was 
to be expected that many would be reprised in 
various forms within other interventions across 
the Commission’s regular segment. Indeed, in 
presenting the 2018 INCB Annual Report, the 
Special Report on availability and, produced 
during the 30th anniversary of the conclusion of 
the 1988 Convention, the Precursors Report,54 
Dr. Sumyai once again stressed that ‘Access to and 
availability of controlled medicines remain a chal-
lenge in many countries. As a result, people go 
without adequate treatment and may even have 
to experience surgical procedures without anaes-
thesia’. In this instance, he also pointed out that the 
Board noted that ‘in a few countries poor regula-
tion and overprescribing of controlled medicines 
has led to increases in drug dependence, overdose 
and diversion’. Similar messages were also includ-
ed within the INCB statement under Item 9 (d): ‘in-
ternational cooperation to ensure the availability 
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for 
medical and scientific purposes while preventing 
their diversion’. Here, having stressed that ‘Almost 
60 years since the adoption of the Single Conven-
tion, the goal of ensuring the availability of and 
access to narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances for medical and scientific purposes is still 
INCB President presents Annual Report at 62nd CND Credit: INCB website
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far from being universally met’, the President high-
lighted steps to improve access; recommended 
steps that had been developed from data report-
ed to the Board and survey responses from gov-
ernments and CSOs.55
In reference to the more general work of the Board 
under Item 9(c), in addition to further discussion of 
Afghanistan, some of the recommendations of the 
Annual Report – including the Board’s opposition to 
capital punishment for drug-related offences – and 
key messages from both the Special and Precur-
sors Reports, the President chose to highlight the 
Annual Report’s thematic chapter. Titled ‘Cannabis 
and cannabinoids for medical, scientific and “rec-
reational” use: risks and benefits’, Dr. Sumyai used 
his focus on the chapter to stress that the Board 
emphasizes that ‘poorly regulated programmes 
can have adverse effects on public health and may 
increase non-medical cannabis use’. Following this 
highly critical – yet in the main feebly evidenced – 
tack, the President went on to say: ‘Also, poorly reg-
ulated medical cannabis programmes can increase 
the risk of diversion of cannabis to non-medical 
use and may also contribute to the legalization of 
“recreational” cannabis use by reducing perceived 
risk associated with use, especially among youth’. 
As well as outlining measures for governments to 
take to prevent such risks, the President also reiter-
ated that ‘personal cultivation of cannabis for medi-
cal use is inconsistent with the obligations’ under 
the Single Convention and that smoking cannabis 
or cannabinoids ‘is not a medically accepted way to 
deliver standardized doses of a medicine’. Here, as 
in other parts of the chapter and hence the Presi-
dent’s comments, the Board seems to be overstep-
ping its mandate. Indeed, it is unclear how the INCB 
can legitimately define how medicinal cannabis 
should be administered. 
As is often the case, responses to the Board’s state-
ments – particularly presentation of the Annual Re-
port – over the course of the CND varied depending 
upon the perspective of the responding state or UN 
body. Indeed, in the main and in line with diplomat-
ic protocol most reactions were positive and polite, 
with delegates picking out aspects of Dr. Sumyai’s 
words that were most pertinent to their current 
circumstances or main issues of concern. For ex-
ample, the EU was supportive of the Board’s ongo-
ing stance on human rights, particularly in relation 
to opposition to the death penalty, and regarding 
the topic of proportionality encouraged the INCB to 
update the 2007 Annual Report on the matter. Simi-
lar support on human rights and extrajudicial acts 
of violence came from, among others, the Dutch 
and the OHCHR. The former noted his apprecia-
tion for the Board’s emphasis on human rights and 
the SDGs and put forward the view that members 
states that do not comply with human rights ob-
ligations, also do not comply with the three drug 
conventions. At the same time and reflecting the 
existence of diametrically opposing views that ex-
ist within the Commission, Indonesia noted that 
in its view any comment by the Board on capital 
punishment was beyond its mandate. All that said, 
other than a few technical queries and complaints 
regarding specific terminology within the Annual 
Report for 201856 and requests from the Dutch and 
the Swiss57 to improve the transparency of country 
missions and check draft findings of mission reports 
before publication, the key area of tension around 
the Board’s work related to cannabis. 
Some states from what might be referred to as the 
more progressive side of the debate openly ques-
tioned aspects of the Board’s stance. For example, 
reacting directly to the recent INCB mission to their 
country, the Swiss, while courteously welcoming 
the Board’s recommendations, requested what in-
formation they were based on. ‘It is important for 
us to foster an open and transparent dialogue’, the 
Swiss delegate noted, before continuing to point 
out that ‘We requested an explanation in our mis-
sion report and now we reiterate this request again’. 
Adding some detail to what remains a private set 
of communications between Bern and the Board, it 
was noted that the goal of the three conventions is 
to protect the health and welfare of mankind and to 
ensure appropriate access to substances for medi-
cal purposes’. As a result, it was argued, ‘the Board 
should support cannabis research’. Moreover, the 
delegate continued, ‘we find it interesting that the 
Board would comment on public perception with-
out any scientific evidence. This is not within their 
mandate as a quasi-judicial body’. Rather it was 
pointed out, ‘It is in the mandate of the WHO’ and 
the INCB should contribute to ‘informed decisions 
of member states based on scientific information 
on all issues’. A similar line of reasoning was put for-
ward by Denmark: ‘We believe reports on how can-
nabis helped patients cannot be ignored bearing in 
mind that medical use differs fundamentally from 
recreational use and also that medical use is in line 
with the three drug conventions’.
  23
The 2019 CN
D
 Report of Proceedings
From the contrary position, several states, including 
Pakistan and Indonesia, wholeheartedly supported 
the Board’s stance on developments in cannabis 
legislation, including its predominately hostile at-
titude to anything other than strictly regulated 
pharmaceutical medical use. That said, of particular 
note were statements from three of the most active 
defenders of the status quo: China, Japan and the 
Russian Federation. The Chinese delegate recount-
ed that the INCB’s Annual Report expressed con-
cern about the ‘legalization of cannabis’, including 
its negative impact on public health, particularly to 
the welfare of youth, its undermining of the legal 
framework set out by the three treaties and the view 
that the policy shift compromised the ‘international 
order’. ‘We concur with this statement’, he said. Ex-
pressing appreciation for the efforts undertaken by 
INCB’, the delegate then stated, ‘We will continue to 
support the INCB’s work’, and perhaps foreshadow-
ing what his colleagues from the Russian Federa-
tion and Japan were about to say, hoped that it ‘will 
play an even greater role within its mandate’.
As well as articulating support for the concerns 
expressed by the INCB that cannabis and cannabi-
noids can have potentially adverse effects on public 
health, the Japanese delegate emphasized that ‘ob-
ligations under the conventions relating to narcotic 
and psychotropic drugs’ mean it is ‘our duty to pre-
vent suffering on human health, peace and security’ 
and that ‘all regions should cooperate and fulfil this 
duty’. ‘We have just confirmed that the three drug 
control conventions are the cornerstones of inter-
national drug control’, he continued, before stating 
that ‘We have a great concern that some countries 
have violated these controls’. 
While such expressions of concern have been 
quite routine in recent years, the Japanese state-
ment also included a significant deviation from 
the standard fare. Indeed, in an escalation of op-
position to regulated markets for the recreational 
use of cannabis and without identifying any par-
ticular nation, the delegate drew attention to the 
fact that Article 14 of the 1961 Convention men-
tions ‘several measures that INCB can take against 
member states that do not uphold the conven-
tions’. This was a position that the Russian Federa-
tion also followed, although in this case without 
the diplomatic protocol that normally prevents 
the identification of specific states. Indeed, the 
unusual bellicosity of the statement from, signifi-
cantly, the Head of the enormous delegation (75 
delegates), Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, is notable. As such, the statement is worth 
referring to at length. 
It begins by noting that: ‘Looking at events of the 
past few years, one cannot fail to note that the in-
ternational community has entered a new and more 
complex phase in the fight against the drug threat. 
Until recently, we had a shared goal and shared un-
derstanding, with universal commitment to three 
drug conventions’. Having attempted to establish the 
notion of some kind of global drug policy nirvana, 
Mr. Lavrov then moved on to highlight that, ‘Several 
states have started to openly challenge the funda-
mental legal principles’ arguing that the ‘legalization 
of marijuana in Canada last year opened a Pandora’s 
box’; clearly by this point a favoured phrase with 
Moscow’s prohibitionist lexicon. In his view, ‘Cases of 
violations are beginning to multiply’ with ‘violators’ 
insisting that this is a ‘normal event that warrants no 
special attention’. In this regard, he continued, ‘We 
fully agree with INCB that the legalization of drugs is 
a serious threat and a violation of international law. 
Selective implementation of legal obligations is un-
acceptable’. 
Moreover, and mindful of the Russian Federation’s 
own selective approach to international law across 
a range of issue areas, he then made the remarkable 
claim that ‘Demonstrably rejecting key provisions is 
hardly compatible with civilized international ob-
ligations’ and could ‘unleash’ a chain reaction. In-
deed, Mr. Lavrov expressed his pleasure that speak-
ers from China and Japan paid special attention to 
this point and believed that they were correct in 
mentioning the use of Article 14 of the 1961 Single 
Convention. Moving back to the idea of the loss of 
universalism, he also noted that some delegations 
called into question the fundamental aims of the 
‘war on drugs’, which have to date served as a unify-
ing basis for international endeavour; specifically, ‘a 
society free of drug abuse, and the task of reducing 
supply and demand’. ‘High international drug stan-
dards are under threat’, he claimed. However, as the 
Outcome Document has shown, Mr. Lavrov contin-
ued, the ‘international community is still capable of 
finding mutual solutions’ and it is ‘possible to agree 
on a strong and balanced text’. ‘Against the back-
drop of recent events’, he concluded ‘there is an in-
creasing need for the INCB to build its collaboration 
with the CND’, with Mr. Lavrov pointing out that his 
country had ‘put forward a resolution on the INCB’s 
work’ (See above in relation to Resolution L3).
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NGO participation: Vibrant, 
vocal and victim of unclear 
rules
NGO engagement in the Plenary 
NGO engagement at this year’s CND was more vi-
brant than ever, with almost 500 civil society rep-
resentatives in attendance,58 the (co-)organisation 
of over 40 side events (see Box 5), the inclusion of 
NGO representatives in various member state del-
egations (including Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway and Switzerland) and a number of state-
ments delivered in the Plenary session. 
The negotiations of the Ministerial Declaration 
showed member states’ inability to agree on which 
document should prevail beyond 2019 – the final 
text eventually reiterating all commitments ad-
opted since 2009. Unsurprisingly, and in a similar 
fashion to member states’ speeches, NGO state-
ments broadly aligned with either the 2009 Po-
litical Declaration (for more conservative NGOs) or 
the UNGASS Outcome Document (for reform-ori-
ented NGOs). As such, interventions from IOGT In-
ternational, the Singapore Anti-Narcotics Associa-
tion and the Turkish Green Crescent Society on the 
implementation of the 2009 Political Declaration 
(agenda item 10, ‘Implementation of the Political 
Declaration and Plan of Action on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced 
Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem’) pro-
moted the status quo, and a focus on drug preven-
tion and recovery measures with the goal of creat-
ing a society free of drugs. The notable exception 
was a palliative care physician from Colombia rep-
resenting the International Association for Hos-
pice and Palliative Care and also speaking on item 
10. The physician called on member states to ad-
dress ongoing legislative, structural and practical 
barriers hampering access to morphine, highlight-
ing the lack of focus on this issue in the 2009 Po-
litical Declaration and the major advances made in 
2016 in this regard.59
As was to be expected, however, most reform-
minded NGOs spoke on item 11 on UNGASS follow-
up.60 These followed a lengthy statement delivered 
by Smart Approaches to Marijuana (SAM) that pre-
sented rather questionable data on the seemingly 
apocalyptic consequences of cannabis legalisation 
in Colorado, including a rise by 100% in impaired 
cannabis driving deaths in the first year of regula-
tion or the claim that over 70% of cannabis shops 
now offer products tailored to pregnant women 
and offering children cannabis candy. Using more 
substantiated data, Harm Reduction International 
offered a bleak drug policy landscape: 4,366 people 
executed for drug offences worldwide since 2008 
and another 7,000 on death row, while lack of po-
litical will and funding have left 99% of people who 
use drugs around the world without adequate ac-
cess to life-saving harm reduction services. Accord-
ing to the Harm Reduction Coalition speaker, the 
2011 global target of halving HIV among people 
who use drugs by 2015 was ‘missed by a stagger-
ing 80%’. ‘Given the explicit endorsement of harm 
reduction within the UN human rights system’, he 
concluded, ‘provision of harm reduction services 
cannot be seen as a policy option at the discretion 
of States, but must instead be understood as a core 
obligation of States to meet their international le-
gal obligations’. 
The need for improved access to harm reduc-
tion, education and treatment grounded in dig-
nity and evidence was also highlighted by Ac-
ción Technical y Social, whose representative 
underscored the unrealistic nature of the drug-
free world goals and concluded that ‘responsible 
regulation’ was not only possible, but also pref-
erable to a war on drugs approach which had 
‘caused more harms than the drugs themselves’, 
especially among young people. Young people’s 
access to harm reduction interventions, without 
fear of punishment, stigma or discrimination, 
was also central to the intervention made by Stu-
dents for Sensible Drug Policies. Issues affecting 
women – another vulnerable group left behind 
by drug policies – were raised by the Women and 
Harm Reduction International Network, who read 
an abstract of the Barcelona Declaration, an ad-
vocacy document drafted by a group of feminists 
calling for drug policy reform.61 
After this followed IDPC’s statement, which re-
ferred to the critical advances made at the UN-
GASS and with the SDGs, and praised the UN 
System Common Position and its implementa-
tion Task Team as milestones in the path towards 
improved ‘UN system-wide coherence on drug 
policy’. Still, referring to IDPC’s Shadow Report62 
the IDPC speaker raised major concerns over the 
many ‘persistent and new challenges’ of drug pol-
icy. These, IDPC concluded, will not be addressed 
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in the coming decade ‘unless there is a significant 
shift and genuine reorientation of drug policies’ 
away from the drug-free goals, criminalisation 
and stigmatisation, and towards policies that truly 
seek to promote human rights, health and devel-
opment, ‘in line with the SDG vision of “leaving no 
one behind”’.
Wednesday’s afternoon session concluded with an 
emotional intervention from the New Zealand Drug 
Foundation on the tragic killings of over 50 Muslim 
people in Christchurch, New Zealand, just a few 
days before the CND. The statement made a strong 
plea to governments: ‘People who use drugs are our 
family. They are amongst us and beside us. And we 
sit beside them. They are us and we are them. If we 
apply such thinking, we see that responses to drug 
use should not be abou t blame or punishment… 
We can support those who need it, provide them 
with opportunities for empowerment, stand beside 
our family as they find solutions to the challenges 
that they face’. 
Also of note was the intervention made by the Ca-
nadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network. During the session 
on the UN drug control treaties, the NGO represen-
tative drew member states’ attention to the Inter-
national Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug 
Policy. ‘States have… repeatedly and unanimously 
declared their commitment to ensuring full re-
spect for human rights in law, policy and practice 
related to drugs’, he stated, while urging member 
states to ‘make use of this new resource in order to 
fulfil this commitment’.63 Friday’s Plenary session 
dedicated to the SDGs (Item 14) provided one last 
opportunity for civil society to offer recommenda-
tions to member states – with interventions from 
the Women and Harm Reduction International Net-
work, Médecins du Monde, Harm Reduction Coali-
tion and ENCOD. Significantly, Médecins du monde 
welcomed the first ever CND resolution on hepatitis 
C, which had just been approved in the CoW after 
lengthy negotiations, highlighting its relevance for 
the achievement of SDG 3.64 
Informal NGO dialogue with the UNODC 
Executive Director: Welcome nuance 
within an increasingly conflictual envi-
ronment
The questions asked by civil society organisations 
at the Informal Dialogue with the UNODC Execu-
tive Director covered concerns with the implemen-
tation of harm reduction measures, availability of 
data on drug use, the use of tramadol (see Box 6), 
the needs of migrants and refugees who use drugs, 
the negative consequences of drug prohibition, the 
criminalisation of drug use, the legal regulation of 
cannabis and prevention programmes – what was 
referred to by IOGT International as the ‘addiction 
industries’ – and the use of the death penalty and 
extrajudicial killings.65
Of particular note was the Executive Director’s re-
sponse to the current crisis of overdose deaths, 
raised in a question by IDPC, where he affirmed 
the UNODC’s collaboration with the WHO, includ-
ing on overdose prevention, and gave the example 
of the Stop Overdose Safely (SOS) initiative that in-
cludes provision of emergency methadone as part 
of their ongoing efforts.66 The Dalgarno Institute 
made its reservations about harm reduction clear, 
and after stating that it should be about ‘drug use 
exiting strategies, not drug use normalisation tac-
tics’, asked the UNODC if it endorsed interpreta-
tions that ‘enable’ and facilitate ongoing drug use. 
In response, Mr. Fedotov referred to the ‘full range 
of interventions’ endorsed by the UN drug control 
system, which include both primary prevention 
and measures to reduce the health and social con-
sequences of use. He then reiterated the impor-
tance of community-based treatment and that the 
UNODC does not support non-medical uses of con-
trolled substances.
On the issue of prevention, Asociación Proyecto 
Hombre referred to the need for member states to 
take adequate measures to provide effective pre-
vention programmes that reach vulnerable groups 
Civil Society representatives address the CND plenary. From left to right: Julián Quintero (ATS – Colombia), Kathryn Leafe (NZNEP – 
New Zealand), Ann Fordham (IDPC Secretariat), Ruth Birgin (WHRIN – Global), Benjamin Phillips (Harm Reduction Coalition – US)
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Box   5  CND side events  
Figure 1. Classification of CND side events based on their progressive/conservative stance, 2009-2019
86 side events were held during the regular session 
of the CND, from Monday 18 to Thursday 21 March.67 
Although this is less than the record-breaking 94 
side events of 2018, it nonetheless made for a busy 
schedule with up to six side events running in parallel. 
A 10-year analysis of side events organised at the 
CND show that progressive side events have largely 
increased over the years – culminating with 54 such 
events at the CND that immediately followed the 
2016 UNGASS, in 2017. In 2019, those progressive 
events comprised about half of all CND side events – 
a slight reduction from the 60-62% recorded in 2016 
and 2017 (see Figure 1).
And indeed, the most popular themes discussed 
this year were prevention and recovery (14 events) 
followed by drug law enforcement strategies (9 
events). However, various events also focused on 
options for drug policy reform (8 events) and harm 
reduction interventions (7 events). Other themes 
addressed this year included methods and ex-
periences of civil society engagement in policy-
making processes, youth, data collection, policies 
towards NPS and synthetic drugs, access to con-
trolled medicines, cannabis policies, development 
and women.
Positively, about a third of side events this 
year were organised or co-sponsored by IDPC 
Launch of IDPC’s report ‘10 years of drug policy in Asia: How 
far have we come?’ at the 62nd session of the CND, Vienna 
Credit: Marie Nougier, IDPC
members.68 The IDPC Secretariat was involved in 
seven events69 on issues related to harm reduction,70 
drug policies in West Africa (francophone event),71 
civil society involvement in government delegations 
at the CND,72 women and incarceration73 and 
data collection,74 and another two to launch Asia- 
and Colombia-focused adaptations75 of IDPC’s 
shadow report for 2019 ‘Taking stock: A decade of  
drug policy’.76
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such as children or women. Mr. Fedotov went on to 
outline the UNODC’s launch of the Listen First pro-
gramme, which focuses on supporting poor coun-
tries to develop family-based activities, in addition 
to existing programmes in 30 countries where he 
said that positive impacts on the resilience and de-
velopment of children have been documented.77 
In response to a question from the Slum Child 
Foundation about the UNODC’s plans to work on 
alternative development programmes in informal 
settlements, Mr. Fedotov was of the view that such 
challenging contexts cannot be solved by focusing 
on drug issues but requires a broader development 
approach including in the framework of implemen-
tation of the SDGs. He hoped that the UN Secretary 
General’s reforms which aim to bring UN agencies 
closer together in their work, will help in enabling a 
comprehensive and efficient approach. 
There was only one question on the issue of legal 
regulation of cannabis, from Smart Approaches to 
Marijuana (SAM), which asked about the UNODC’s 
position on member states legalising cannabis 
including in the USA, whether it was allowed un-
der the UN conventions and whether Mr. Fedotov 
thought it was a good or bad development. In 
what seemed to be a rather neutral position, Mr. 
Fedotov responded that whatever is not support-
ed by the conventions by definition contravenes 
international law, and in the case of the USA the 
issue of cannabis regulation is a matter between 
the federal government and the states. He referred 
further to the INCB and its stated position that 
cannabis regulation contravenes the treaties, and 
that while one country cannot change the provi-
sions of international law, it is for member states 
to decide on modification of the conventions. On 
a related note, the Foundation for Alternative Ap-
proaches to Addiction Think & Do Tank (FAAAT) 
asked how drug policies can be modified to cre-
ate a more balanced approach without creating 
a prohibitionist environment under which traf-
ficking can thrive and people who use drug are 
imprisoned as criminals. Mr. Fedotov referred to 
existing commitments including the Ministerial 
Declaration agreed in the previous week that sup-
port a balanced approach and said that such an 
approach needs to focus on people’s health and 
rights, while also requiring an important focus on 
law enforcement aimed at supply reduction. 
In response to IOGT International’s question about 
the possibility of the UNODC working to facilitate 
a discussion on protecting government decision-
making from the ‘growing influence of the addic-
tion industries’, Mr. Fedotov interestingly respond-
ed that oversimplification of different views, along 
with over-politicisation, is not helpful and urged 
all to listen to the views of others and not consider 
people with different views as enemies. 
After Mr. Fedotov departed the Informal Dia-
logue, the Chief of the UNODC’s Organised Crime 
and Trafficking Branch responded to IDPC’s ques-
tion about the agency’s efforts to counter use of 
the death penalty and extrajudicial killings in the 
name of drug control, by saying that they issue 
advice to member states against use of the death 
penalty. In what appears to be of notable signifi-
cance given the UNODC’s resistance against spe-
cifically recommending the decriminalisation of 
drug use, the agency’s lead on drug prevention 
and health, Mr. Gilberto Gerra, responded to a 
question from Paroles Autour de la Santé about 
the criminalisation of people who use drugs by 
saying that the conventions do no oblige mem-
ber states to do so and that in the past ten years 
the UNODC has promoted a culture of decrimi-
nalisation of minor crimes and people who use 
drugs, at all levels. 
Informal NGO dialogue with the 
INCB President: Cordial and largely 
spontaneous, but still some way to go
The informal NGO dialogue with Dr. Viroj Sumyai was 
held on Wednesday 20 March.78 As with the other 
dialogues, questions were submitted in advance 
through the VNGOC. 
Possibly for first time, in such a dialogue, the INCB 
President put significant emphasis on the role of 
the WHO and its mandate in the drug policy field. 
This was the case in Dr. Sumyai’s responses on the 
prescription of medicines for Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) and their links with suicide rates 
(asked by FAAAT), evidence on the medical canna-
bis use (from ICEERS), a possible technical discrep-
ancy in the WHO’s ECDD recommendation on can-
nabis (raised by the Community Alliances for Drug 
Free Youth), and the therapeutic potential of psy-
chedelics (INPUD). As the INCB has often been criti-
cised by IDPC on its tendency for ‘mission creep’,79 
the fact that the President put the WHO’s role front 
and centre in his responses on a variety of health-
related issues is to be welcomed. 
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As expected, several questions related to cannabis. 
ICEERS kicked off those discussions by requesting 
guidance for states to implement medical cannabis 
programmes. In response, the INCB President high-
lighted that the 1961 Single Convention does allow 
access of cannabis for medical purposes, although, 
he added, the prerogative to establish such pro-
grammes remains with member states. Responding 
to a question by Latinoamerica Reforma regarding 
which cannabis products are allowed within those 
schemes, the INCB President discarded home cul-
tivation, cannabis oil, as well as the flowering top 
of the cannabis plant or the leaf itself. ‘Smoking the 
cannabis plant is not medical cannabis’, he said, re-
flecting the Board’s questionable position on non-
pharmaceutical cannabis contained within the 
thematic chapter of the Annual Report for 2018. 
According to the INCB then, medicinal cannabis 
would only be limited to pharmaceutical products 
– despite the fact that several countries do allow for 
a variety of cannabis products (including the plant 
itself, oils and teas) in their own national schemes.82 
The Board promised to clarify its position through 
guidelines on the cultivation and production of me-
dicinal cannabis. On this issue, it should be noted 
that the INCB did not mention the WHO’s mandate 
or its just-released critical review of the plant. 
The responses from Dr. Sumyai on non-medical 
cannabis use also reflected the ongoing conser-
vative stance of the Board on this sensitive issue, 
when WOLA requested a clarification regarding the 
INCB’s views on whether it considers the USA to be 
in compliance with the UN drug control treaties in 
light of its state-level cannabis regulation reforms. 
There, the INCB President made a somewhat odd 
analogy, comparing the USA to ‘a big family’: ‘The 
United States has 51 sons, 51 states. You have ten 
stubborn ones. What are you going to do with your 
sons? The Federal government must impose some 
measures on the stubborn child. The Federal gov-
ernment does it already’. Dr. Sumyai then reiterated 
Box   6   Tramadol: Still bubbling in the background  
Mindful of the emerging hostility towards the WHO’s 
Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) seen 
at this year’s Commission, it is worthwhile highlighting 
some of the comments made by member states in 
reference to tramadol. 
It will be recalled how at its 41st meeting in November 
2018 the ECDD recommended against the 
international scheduling of the drug; a synthetic opioid 
used as a painkiller particularly in many parts of the 
so-called developing world.80 Judging by numerous 
references to the drug in CND debates, it is likely that, 
despite now being considered for control six times by 
the Committee, tramadol will soon end up back on its 
agenda. 
For example, while noting the importance of access, 
Cameroon stressed increased illicit trafficking as did 
Egypt, with the latter stating that it was ‘high time 
to impose international control on all shipments 
of tramadol’. This was a position echoed by China, 
which noted with ‘regret’ the ‘WHO stopping short 
of scheduling’. There was in its view, a need for the 
international control, ‘while allowing access’. Similarly, 
while speaking initially on the issue of cannabis, Nigeria 
noted ‘We welcome the votes on the postponement 
of the recommendation of WHO, however we are 
concerned that tramadol has become one of the most 
used drugs in West Africa and our research indicates 
that tramadol is the second most used drug in Nigeria’. 
‘A dangerous pattern is emerging where the contents 
of some pills go from 100mg to 500mg’, the delegate 
said, before concluding that ‘we believe that tramadol 
should be kept under review and be scheduled’. 
At the UNODC side event ‘Opioid crisis: Tramadol in 
West Africa and other regions’, Dr. Axel Klein81 of GDPO 
made a useful observation about the issue: ‘What we 
have failed to understand is that, talking about inter-
national control, this will have a serious impact on pa-
tients who are currently left with nothing to rely on for 
their pain. What we also need to understand is that the 
leakages of tramadol are mainly falsified tramadol and 
not from the medical sector. Our concern needs to be 
on the falsified medicines such as anti-malarial, antibi-
otics flooding our markets and causing deaths. Sched-
uling it will have serious consequences on patients. 
Pain is a health issue and deliberately allowing people 
to suffer in pain without making available medicines 
for pain management is a gross violation of their fun-
damental human rights to adequate health service’.
However, looking at the on-going pressure of some 
member states it is unlikely they will accept the ECDD’s 
decision without some push back. Watch this space. 
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the Board’s willingness to continue its dialogue 
with the Federal government, encouraging it ‘to 
solve the problem’ – although since most reforms 
were decided by referendum, it seems unlikely that 
the government would impose harsh sanctions on 
those states, despite reprimands from the Board.
Next came a question by IOGT International, asking 
the INCB President which additional tools the INCB 
might need to better respond to breeches of the 
drug conventions. Dr. Sumyai highlighted the INCB’s 
role as a ‘quasi-judicial body’ which decides ‘what is 
right or wrong according to the Conventions’, con-
cluding that they already had all necessary tools at 
their disposal within the treaties. However, he ex-
plained, although the INCB takes initial diplomatic 
steps, it is eventually up to member states and the 
CND to take further action. He also highlighted 
the need to keep difficult conversations with non-
compliant member states confidential to avoid dip-
lomatic tensions: ‘we cannot make member states 
lose face with the situation’, he concluded. 
Although IOGT’s intervention was clearly an at-
tempt to criticise cannabis regulation, the ques-
tion is also relevant for human rights violations 
committed in the name of drug control – an issue 
raised by ENCOD at the dialogue. In this regard, 
the INCB reiterated the need to respect the prin-
ciple of proportionality of sentencing and to abol-
ish capital punishment for drug offences. Another 
human rights issue touched upon was women’s 
severely limited access to drug dependence treat-
ment, raised by Asociación Proyecto Hombre. The 
INCB President shared these concerns, nothing 
that ‘stigma is the most important barrier for seek-
ing treatment’.
Regarding civil society engagement in the work of 
the INCB, IDPC enquired as to whether the Board 
was planning a second civil society hearing – us-
ing the same model as the very first event of this 
nature, held in May 2018 on cannabis. The INCB 
President responded enthusiastically, the issue hav-
ing already been explored at the Board’s session in 
February and confirmed that a second hearing, this 
time on ‘young people and drugs’, would be held 
in May. At this point, Dr. Sumyai underscored the 
importance for the Board to hear ‘from advocacy 
groups from the grassroots level on the situation on 
the ground concerning young people and drugs’.
Finally, focusing on the lack of transparency sur-
rounding the INCB’s work, IDPC requested clarifica-
tion as to why the Board’s reports on country visits 
and other events were not made available in the 
public domain, as is the case for most UN agencies. 
The INCB’s response was rather convoluted, the 
President referring once again to the issue of con-
fidentiality – although this would not entirely ex-
plain why even the said member states have no ac-
cess to these reports, an issue which as mentioned 
above Switzerland questioned during the Plenary 
debate.83 
Juan Fernandez Ochoa, IDPC, asking a question at the informal dialogue with the INCB President Credit: Béchir Bouderbala
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Overall, this year’s dialogue with the INCB was 
cordial, perhaps with the most spontaneous dis-
cussions of the three dialogues held this year and 
showed increased openness to debate with civil 
society on a number of issues. However, the INCB 
President has a long way to go to ensure a more 
balanced and evidence-based approach to canna-
bis policy reform. 
Informal NGO dialogue with the CND 
Chair: Important issues, some vague 
responses
On Thursday 21 March, civil society met with the CND 
Chair, Ambassador Mirghani Abbaker Altayev of Su-
dan, and the Nigerian Facilitator, Ambassador Vivian 
Okeke. A brief opening statement from both Ambas-
sadors was followed by carefully crafted responses 
to the questions sent out in advance by civil society 
organisations. These were followed by additional 
questions from the participants, allowing for more 
interactivity and spontaneity in the discussions.84 
IDPC kicked off the dialogue by asking the CND 
Chair to elaborate on the steps taken by the Com-
mission to address the discrepancies between UN 
drug control and human rights obligations with 
regards to the rights of indigenous peoples. In re-
sponse, the CND Chair reiterated the obligation for 
member states to protect the ‘health and welfare of 
humankind’ and to take account of traditional uses 
in accordance with the treaties. However, the Chair 
carefully avoided the crux of the matter: that the 
conventions themselves include clear contradic-
tions that constitute a major barrier to the enjoy-
ment of human rights by indigenous groups. This 
general response did little, therefore, to explain the 
steps the CND had undertaken to address this criti-
cal issue.
In a similar vein, ICEERS requested information on 
the CND’s strategy to respond to the criminalisation 
of migrant communities for their traditional use of 
the coca leaf, as is currently the case in Spain.85 On 
this issue, the CND Chair highlighted the role of UN 
member states in calling for the scheduling of sub-
stances, where the CND can then ‘bear in mind the 
economy, social, legal and other factors in consid-
ers relevant’ (although interestingly the WHO’s key 
role on this matter was not mentioned in the CND 
Chair’s response). 
Regarding the deployment of evidence-based 
health interventions for people who use drugs, 
the Asian Harm Reduction Network asked about 
the possibility for the CND to establish a scientific 
working group in charge of comparing national 
policy efforts around harm reduction and drug de-
pendence treatment. The Nigerian Facilitator did 
not respond to this specific request, underscoring 
instead the discussions held on this specific issue 
at past CND intersessionals and during the negotia-
tions of the Ministerial Declaration and resolutions 
at this year’s CND (no doubt in light of resolutions 
L.4 on hepatitis C, L.7 on synthetic opioids and L.9 
on HIV prevention among women who use drugs). 
When asked by the VNGOC about the possibility of 
holding future thematic discussions to follow up on 
the Ministerial Segment and UNGASS implemen-
tation, the CND Secretariat provided a rather non-
committal response about the possibility of this 
happening, ‘subject to budgetary resources’. 
Moving on to the development aspects of drug pol-
icy, the CND Chair was asked to describe the work 
that the Commission had been undertaking to en-
sure that drug policies are aligned with the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. Here again, 
the response was rather vague, with references to 
the Ministerial Declaration’s recognition that drug 
policies and the SDGs are ‘complementary and mu-
tually reinforcing’ and its commitment to accelerate 
the implementation of all commitments ‘to ensure 
that nobody affected by the world drug problem is 
left behind’. 
The rest of the discussions focused on civil society 
participation in CND debates. The French Civil Soci-
ety Platform on Drug Policy raised the issue of visa 
refusals for several NGO colleagues who wanted to 
attend the Commission meeting this year – includ-
ing representatives of affected populations, mostly 
from Africa and Asia. The CND Chair was particularly 
sympathetic on this issue, as several of his African 
government colleagues had also got their visa de-
nied this year. NGO participants were informed that 
delivering visas is unfortunately a prerogative of 
the Austrian government, and the CND Chair and 
Secretariat can do very little to help. Recommenda-
tions going forward included sending visa requests 
as early as possible and seeking a support letter 
from the VNGOC (as an organisation based in Aus-
tria. See Box 7). 
The Chair was then asked by the EU Civil Society 
Forum on Drugs whether NGOs could be better in-
volved in regional or open-ended working group 
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Box   7   VNGOC Annual General Meeting and elections
As is customary at the CND, the Vienna NGO Committee 
on Drugs (VNGOC) held its Annual General Meeting 
(AGM), in a packed room on Tuesday 19 March. 
The 90-or-so organisations present reflected the 
increasingly balanced membership of the Committee, 
with both reform- and abstinence-minded NGOs 
present. As well as several routine agenda items and 
points of order, the meeting included more in-depth 
discussions about the possible future structure of the 
UN NGO committees on drugs, as well as elections 
for three of the six Board positions. The membership 
also discussed a proposed ‘Code of Conduct’ for NGOs 
attending the CND – something that became even 
more timely following a series of flashpoints during the 
preceding days (see below).
Regarding the UN NGO committee structure, a back-
ground paper was issued by the VNGOC Board outlin-
ing some key considerations.86 Since the early 1980s, 
there have been NGO Committees on drugs based 
in Vienna and New York – with a varied history of en-
gagement and collaboration, including in the wide-
reaching ‘Beyond 2008’ exercise and more recently for 
the Civil Society Task Force that had ensured strong 
NGO engagement over the past year. Members pre-
sent – including some who were members of both 
Committees (such as IDPC) – were invited to share 
their thoughts about the current situation and what 
they see as the best way forward. It was clear that a 
variety of views were held in the room: some partici-
pants were keen to emphasise the perceived promi-
nence of the VNGOC over its sister organisation in 
New York, while others were keen to highlight the 
value of having both structures in place. Many partici-
pants reflected a preference for a simpler, single com-
mittee going forward – one with a global remit and 
membership (as both the VNGOC and NYNGOC cur-
rently have). Inevitably, the devil is in the detail about 
how this might be achieved, and what it will look like. 
A decision was taken by consensus to mandate the 
VNGOC Board to explore the options over the com-
ing year, and through consultation with members, the 
NYNGOC and other stakeholders, to present recom-
mendations at the 2020 CND.
For the first time, following the adoption of new Stat-
utes and Rules of Procedure in 2017, elections were 
held for three of the six Board positions – rather than 
all six positions being elected every two years – to 
ensure better transitions and sustainability. Whereas 
the process and atmosphere were noticeably tense at 
the 2018 elections, this year’s event was far more con-
trolled and efficient – with credit to the Nominations 
Committee (Ernesto Cortes, George Ochieng Odalo, 
Hannah Hetzer and Linda Nilsson) who volunteered 
to manage the nominations and voting processes. 
Votes could be cast in person, by proxy, through on-
line participation (Skype) or by email in advance.
First up was the position of Chair, and the election was 
won by Jamie Bridge from IDPC, with around 75% of 
the votes cast. The position of Deputy Treasurer was 
uncontested, meaning that the incumbent – Zoran 
Jelic from Stjena Resoc, Croatia – was elected for a 
further two years. The final position of Deputy Secre-
tary had three nominees and was won by Penny Hill 
from Harm Reduction Australia with just over 50% of 
the votes cast. This maintained a very healthy balance 
within the Board in terms of gender and ideological 
perspectives – although notably lacking representa-
tion from Asia and Africa.
The new VNGOC Board, following the elections on Tuesday 19 March. Left-Right: Sarah Piker (VNGOC Project Manager, Austria), Tania 
Ramirez (Secretary, Mexico), Penny Hill (Deputy Secretary, Australia), Jamie Bridge (Chairperson, United Kingdom), Lucia Goberna 
(Deputy Chairperson, Spain), Orsi Feher (Treasurer, Austria), and Zoran Jelic (Deputy Treasurer, Croatia)
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meetings of the CND. This was met by welcome 
comments from the Sudanese Ambassador who 
took the opportunity to highlight the many civil so-
ciety interventions made in Plenary (noting – some-
what erroneously – that some of these statements 
were ‘much longer than those from member states, 
and we have let it go!’), and agreeing to look into 
further participation. The CND Secretariat men-
tioned the involvement of civil society in the ARQ 
review process in December 2017 as a good prac-
tice example – although it should be noted that 
such NGO engagement was severely limited and 
heavily criticised by IDPC.87 But the CND Secretariat 
showed some caution about NGO involvement in 
more technical meetings such as those of the CND 
subsidiary bodies. This was echoed by the Nigerian 
Facilitator who mentioned possible resistance by 
some member states on sensitive issues related to 
drug law enforcement. 
Finally, as in previous years, FAAAT Think & Do Tank 
asked about the possibility of video streaming the 
CND through UN Web TV, allowing for better visibil-
ity of the debates for those unable to attend, and 
a recording of the plenary sessions with multilin-
gual functionality. While welcoming the idea, the 
CND Chair mentioned lack of resources, and rec-
ommended that this request be redirected towards 
UNOV and the UN in New York. 
Heightened tensions between civil 
society and UN security: ‘You know the 
rules’ 
The seemingly arbitrary and impervious command 
of the UN security services has been an ongoing 
bug-bear for some civil society participants over 
the years – including at the UNGASS itself when 
materials were confiscated and participants were 
refused entry for having images of cannabis on 
their t-shirts.88 Yet matters came to a head at the 
62nd CND, leading to threats of expulsion, removed 
building passes, and other sanctions against civil 
society participants.
The main magnifier of these tensions was an exhibi-
tion stand from the Philippine Government, lauding 
their ‘Anti-Illegal Drugs Strategy’ as a great success 
and a model to be replicated. Having pro-drug war 
exhibitions from member states is nothing new for 
the ‘rotunda’ (the central hall of the Vienna Interna-
tional Centre): previous years have seen elaborate 
stands and displays from the likes of Saudi Arabia 
and Singapore, for example. Yet this year’s promo-
tions understandably riled many human rights de-
fenders at the Commission, coming as it does from 
a government that has murdered more than 12,000 
people89 under the watch of a President – pictured 
on the central banner – who has personally urged 
members of the public to kill people they suspect 
of using drugs.90 
The flashpoint came on the final day of the Ministe-
rial Segment, Friday 15 March, when a group of 15-
20 civil society participants held a protest and ‘die-in’ 
in front of the exhibition. Security were quick onto 
the scene and started to take names and photos of 
those participating as the protest had not been pre-
approved and was consequently a violation of the 
UN’s security rules. As many of the participants were 
officially attending as representatives of third-party 
NGOs (due to the rules around access passes), this 
threatened to impact on the ECOSOC status and fu-
ture participation of some key NGOs – including the 
VNGOC itself! In the end, and after prolonged dis-
cussions and efforts to de-escalate the situation, no 
further action was taken. But the message was clear: 
the CND remains a member states meeting, and civil 
society must respect this space. Any protests must 
be pre-notified and approved, or held outside (as has 
been the case in the past). 
The following Monday, behind-the-scenes discus-
sions continued about the protest, the conduct of 
security staff, and how to avoid any further flash-
points. Yet on the same day, and completely unre-
lated to the Friday event, IDPC coordinated a group 
photo in the central courtyard as part of its ongoing 
Support Don’t Punish campaign.91 Unlike Friday’s 
event, this had been pre-notified to the security 
team in Vienna, and permission had been secured 
via email. Yet when the group – around 75 people 
– gathered for the photo, security once again de-
scended and began to make their presence felt. 
When presented with the email providing permis-
sion, they responded that the Support. Don’t Pun-
ish posters were not allowed as they constituted a 
protest. When challenged on where this rule is writ-
ten, the security personnel doubled-down on their 
stance and once again began to threaten people 
with expulsion and sanctions. As the convenors, 
IDPC agreed to put the posters away (these were 
taken by security and never returned), and to take 
the photo anyway. Yet after the photo was taken, se-
curity insisted on keeping the whole group outside 
for a protracted, stern lecture about their behaviour. 
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When one participant tried to re-enter the building 
rather than listen to the admonishment, he was es-
corted out of the UN building and his access pass 
was confiscated (the participant in question was 
eventually allowed back into the meeting after a 
one-day suspension, after intervention from both 
the UNODC and the Dutch Government). 
During the rebuke, one woman in particular intro-
duced herself as the ‘Head of Security’ and informed 
the participants that ‘You are only here because we 
invite you’ and that ‘You know the rules’. And this 
is where an important problem seems to lie; civil 
society participants at the CND are constantly told 
about these ‘rules’ (especially when they are inad-
vertently broken), yet they have never seen them. 
Where, for example, does it say that holding up a 
poster is a protest, or one cannot wear an image of 
cannabis, or that certain messages are prohibited? 
The reality is that these all appear to be arbitrary 
rules and that everything is at the discretion of an 
all-powerful security service that does not under-
stand the issues being discussed and debated. For 
example, group photos with posters have passed 
with no concern at CNDs in previous years, includ-
ing for the Support. Don’t Punish campaign as well 
as many UNODC campaigns and slogans. Yet, as 
what might be seen as a knee-jerk over-compen-
sation for the events on Friday, the security per-
sonnel over-reacted and unnecessarily escalated 
the situation on Monday. It seems clear, therefore, 
that greater clarity is needed on the rules and lim-
its of civil society expression at the UN in Vienna, as 
well as better dialogue with the security services to 
prevent any similar clashes in 2020.92
UNODC budgetary, governance and 
management issues 
While perhaps lacking the theatre and rhetorical flair 
once surrounding discussions of the UNODC budget 
and financial situation,93 the issue remains one of 
serious reflection and concern. Indeed, as both 
discussion under item 8 (Strategic management, 
budgetary and administrative questions) 
and information within the accompanying 
documentation reveals, the Office continues to 
pursue an uncomfortable balancing act to deliver 
the increasing demands of member states on 
reduced resources; an ongoing dilemma once again 
writ large in relation to General Purpose Funding 
(GPF) where the trend in contributions continues ‘to 
be worrying’.94 In this regard, ‘income levels continue 
to raise serious concerns about medium-term 
sustainability’. Despite a slight growth in projected 
income – the result of increased contributions from 
Sweden and Luxembourg – general-purpose funds 
‘constitute a mere 1.2 per cent of extrabudgetary 
contributions’. This, according to the UNODC, 
coupled with tight earmarking of special-purpose 
contributions, ‘hinders the ability’ of the Office 
‘to execute its mandates, manage programmatic 
shortfalls, exert strategic direction and oversight, 
and implement improvements, including United 
Nations reform initiatives’.95 To be sure, although the 
pressure on GPF has in the past sometimes been 
offset to a certain degree by a solid commitment 
by member states to Special Purpose Funds (SPF), 
the biennium 2018-19 saw special purpose income 
Philippines stand in the VIC Rotunda, during the 62nd CND Credit: Drug Reporter 
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adjusted downward. This represented a drop of 
USD 33 million to a total of USD 629.4 million.96 
As of December last year, the income projection 
reflected increased contributions from Mexico, 
Norway and Panama, and lower contributions from 
others in 2018. 
In terms of programme delivery, the UNODC cur-
rently estimates a figure of USD 648.9 million, a 
decrease of USD 23.6 million from the initial bud-
get. This fits with the observation that overall there 
had been a reduction in SPF implementation dur-
ing the period 2012-2019 and related programme 
support cost income.97 The recent downward revi-
sion is seen to reflect decreased delivery in 2018 of 
USD 298.2 million (initial budget USD 365.4 million) 
with higher projected estimates for 2019 of USD 
350.7 million (initial budget USD 307.0 million), an 
increase of 17.6% from the revised estimates for 
2018. Interestingly, the decrease in the biennial 
programme projections owed much to lower deliv-
ery in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially 
the delayed start of a new alternative development 
project in Colombia.98 All of this demonstrates the 
fluid and challenging financial environment within 
which the UNODC continues to operate. Moreover, 
as the UNODC Director of Management Affairs 
pointed out in the Plenary, all current discussion 
of the Office’s operation is taking place within the 
context of a UN system-wide initiative focusing on 
management reform, including the transfer of a 
number of central support functions to ‘global ser-
vices centres’ and the establishment in the field of 
‘common back-office facilities’.
While the implications for the UNODC are still being 
considered, including in relation to costs, the Direc-
tor managed to maintain an upbeat tone. Presum-
ably referring to the revised projected estimates 
for programme delivery, the Director noted that 
we ‘appreciate donor confidence’ and are expect-
ing a 17 per cent increase in our budget. He also 
noted that ‘It is a time of transformation for the UN 
as a whole, with wide ranging reforms coming into 
place this year’. ‘We strive for a more nimble, efficient 
and effective organisation’, he continued. In this re-
gard, he stressed how the Office looked forward to 
the implementation of the global service delivery 
model, pointed out how UNODC field offices would 
benefit from country team operational and support 
platforms and highlighted how the extension of the 
Umoja online management system99 would be key 
in relation to planning and managing capacities. 
Civil society representatives gathered to take a family photo for the Support. Don’t Punish campaign Credit: Juan Fernandez Ochoa, IDPC
  35
The 2019 CN
D
 Report of Proceedings
Much discussion under Item 8, however, con-
cerned staff composition and matters relating to 
the ongoing work of the standing open-ended in-
tergovernmental working group on improving the 
governance and financial situation of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (FINGOV).100 The 
group’s chair was keen to relay news of the hard 
work undertaken, including three informal meet-
ings in late 2018 and a formal meeting in January 
2019 and, stressing widespread participation by a 
range of delegations, pointed out that 10 years af-
ter its establishment, FINGOV was still working to 
enhance transparency. 
This was in the main well received. Not missing 
the opportunity to get on the record the fact that 
it provided about USD 70 million to GPF, the USA 
encouraged ongoing reforms and highlighted 
that – while there were still concerns regarding 
programme support costs – FINGOV is a ‘vital tool 
for transparency’. This was a view echoed by Brazil. 
Reflecting concerns about funding, Chile noted 
the general drop in GPF and requested member 
states to increase contributions. Similarly, Jamaica 
noted the ‘fragile’ and ‘vulnerable’ state of non-ear-
marked funding.
As has been the case in previous years, interest in 
transparency and openness related particularly to 
gender parity and balanced geographical repre-
sentation. Both of which, the UNODC was keen to 
point out, were being promoted by the Executive 
Director who, to some extent placing the responsi-
bility back on national capitals, encouraged mem-
ber states to propose ‘diverse candidates’ for Office 
positions. Speaking from the floor, several states 
passively pushed back on this stance by stating that 
more could be done by the Office itself. Chile, for 
example, pointed out shortfalls in geographic rep-
resentation from Latin America and gender balance 
within senior positions within the UNODC secre-
tariat. Korea also requested more gender balance, 
with Jamaica welcoming both the process of gen-
der mainstreaming and noting with concern the 
underrepresentation of some countries in the UNO-
DC staff. On this point, Brazil noted that the lack of 
representatives from GRULAC was ‘significant’ and 
that ‘immediate change is paramount’. Additionally, 
while the USA expressed its enthusiasm for a 50-
50 gender balance, Brazil – generally pleased with 
progress – requested more information on what 
processes were being deployed to ensure better 
gender balance. 
Conclusions
Despite expectations, this year’s CND was in many 
ways an inversion of previous sessions involving 
a high-level segment. For example, at the 2009 
session, it seemed as if having expended so much 
energy on the Ministerial Segment, member 
states had little left for regular segment; a session 
that consequently felt somewhat flat.101 This year, 
however, with what almost appeared to be a desire 
to quickly get the Ministerial Declaration out of the 
way, member states used their high-level statements 
as springboards from which to energetically 
support and pursue their preferred policy positions 
within the regular segment; a segment that was 
marked by unusually undiplomatic language and 
demeanour. 
That said, reflecting upon what was ultimately a 
dynamic, fluid and at times contradictory envi-
ronment, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions 
or make definitive assessments of the CND’s 62nd 
session, including its Ministerial Segment. Yet, it 
is also difficult to ignore the remarkable resilience 
displayed by the UN drug control system and the 
ability of a body like the Commission to absorb di-
vergence on how best to deal with the ‘world drug 
problem’; a vague phenomenon relating to an in-
creasingly complex, diverse and, according to the 
UN’s own World Drug Report, expanding illicit drugs 
market. Indeed, as the preceding pages here have 
shown, there remains division and associated ten-
sion within the CND, in some cases increasing year 
on year, around several core issues. 
Nevertheless, while in our report on the 2018 CND 
we wondered ‘how long will the Commission be 
able to maintain the pretence of business as usu-
al?’102 we find ourselves asking the same question 
a year on. In spite of the inescapable sands of di-
vergence within its gears, the CND’s consensus-
driven machinery continues to grind away; albeit in 
an increasingly juddering fashion. And amidst that 
grinding, some positive progress was made. For 
example, increasing and apparently genuine con-
cern regarding access to controlled medicines was 
a feature of the meeting, with negotiations around 
several of the resolutions, for instance L4, L9 and, 
after much torment and deliberation, L3, ultimately 
resulting in decent texts. Furthermore, putting the 
unfortunate interaction with the VIC security aside, 
NGO engagement was once again overwhelmingly 
positive. This was noticeable not only in inclusion of 
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statements within session and references to the val-
ue of civil society within the statements of various 
countries and UN agencies, but also the inclusion 
of a number of NGO representatives within coun-
try delegations, with Canada, Mexico, New Zealand 
and Switzerland being noteworthy in this regard. 
On the flipside, despite high-level rhetorical com-
mitments within a range of soft law instruments, in-
cluding the freshly minted Ministerial Declaration, 
it is hard not to note with concern the continuing 
divergence on the issue of human rights and the 
multiple tensions that result, including in relation 
to the SDGs. Moreover, on a related point, with the 
Ministerial Declaration having ostensibly set the 
direction for the next decade of international drug 
policy there remains a lack of clarity concerning the 
system-wide character of the processes for review-
ing ‘progress in implementing all [our] international 
drug policy commitments’, in 2029 and during a 
‘mid-term review’ in 2024.103 Indeed, amidst discus-
sion about data collection and the ongoing review 
of the ARQ, it is important not to lose sight of ef-
forts to measure progress relating to the intersec-
tions between both the Sustainable Development 
Agenda and the high-level commitments made to 
human rights within a range of ‘complementary 
and mutually reinforcing’ soft law instruments. 
Towards this end, the nascent UN system coordi-
nation Task Team could be leveraged to further 
improve engagement of the wider UN family and 
strengthen the gains made over the last decade 
on intersectionality between drug control, human 
rights, health and development.
Meanwhile, although the implementation of a 
regulated market in Canada meant that the non-
medical use of cannabis was always likely to be a 
contentious issue, it was unfortunate to witness the 
pugnaciousness and shear aggression shown on 
occasions by the delegation from the Russian Fed-
eration; an approach meted out to both the Cana-
dian delegation and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the 
ECDD. Significantly, the tone of some interventions 
may represent a shift within the political dynamics 
of the Commission, a space that has to some de-
gree in the past few years been home to a politi-
cally calculated denial of the reality of treaty breach 
in relation to cannabis. Mindful of this shift, from 
not just the Russian Federation but also from other 
supporters of the status quo like Japan, comes in-
creasing pressure to find a way to resolve tensions 
around cannabis regulation; tensions that are likely 
to increase as a number of countries, including cru-
cially Mexico, look set to follow a similar path to 
Canada. 
Indeed, while there appears to be an increasingly 
uncomfortable synergy of views between the Rus-
sian Federation and the INCB on the issue of canna-
bis the Board is correct to claim that the regulated 
markets lay outside the boundaries of the extant 
treaty framework. Moreover, it is also right in say-
ing, as did the President during the NGO informal 
dialogue, that while the INCB can take diplomatic 
steps on the issue, it is ultimately up to member 
states to take further action; although to be fair he 
was probably thinking more in terms of sanction 
than solution. However, it is worth pointing out the 
position justifiably adopted by Mr. Fedotov on the 
issue when he noted that ‘it is for member states 
to decide on modification of the conventions’. To be 
sure, while the Board can be criticised for failing to 
adequately assist in seeking to resolve the current 
dilemma around cannabis, for the sake of interna-
tional law if not the international drug control sys-
tem specifically, the time is surely right for member 
states themselves to seek a legally robust and po-
litically realistic way out of the increasingly pressing 
predicament. 
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